I have here a table of the total vote at the elections in different years. In August, 1861, it was 10,580; in December, 1861, 9,354; in October, 1862, 8,224; in September, 1864, 5,769; in September, 1865, 5,895: so that you will perceive from 1861 to 1865 the vote constantly diminishing, being at the beginning upward of 10,000, and at the end less than 6,000. And when the Constitution was submitted, only 3,025 voted for it, while 2,870 voted against it. The present question is, whether 5,895 voters shall be invested with the powers of a State; whether they shall send into this Chamber two Senators, whose votes shall be equal to the vote of New York, of Pennsylvania, of Ohio, or of Massachusetts. Is that just? Is it fair? When a State is once admitted into the Union, we all know, that, under the National Constitution, it is on a footing of perfect equality; therefore, in advance, before we receive a State into that high equality, we should well consider whether it is in its population entitled to such eminence. It is no answer to say that Pennsylvania, New York, Ohio, and Massachusetts have large political weight in the other House, which this new State, if received, will not have. The question is, whether in the Senate it will not have a weight to which such a number of voters cannot be justly entitled. This leads me to consider for one moment the functions of the Senate. The Senate of the United States is a peculiar body, utterly without precedent or parallel in the history of any other constitutional government, differing from the upper House of the English Parliament, from the upper House of the French Chambers, from the upper House in Prussia, from the upper House in Italy, inasmuch as it has three functions,--one legislative, one diplomatic, and one executive. By its legislative function, it acts, in coöperation with the other House, in the making of laws; by its diplomatic function, it acts, without coöperation with the other House, on treaties with foreign powers; and by its executive function, it acts, without the other House, on the nominations of the President. A preponderance of power possessed by the larger States in the House of Representatives cannot affect the last two functions, the diplomatic and the executive; and the precise question is, whether a few voters, not numbering six thousand, in a distant Territory, shall be organized so as to enter this Chamber, and on questions of diplomacy and on executive questions to neutralize the vote of a large State. Even conceding that on legislative questions, through the preponderance of the large States in the other House, there may be a certain remedy to this disorder, there is no such remedy in the exercise of these two other important functions of the Senate. I submit, therefore, that it is not advisable at this moment to invest this small number of voters with these vast political powers. They must wait a little longer,--wait until they are