but þe ymaginac{i}ou{n} comeþ to remuable bestes þat seme{n} to han talent to fleen or to desiren any þinge. [Sidenote: Reason, however, is the attribute of man alone, as Intelligence is that of God.] but resou{n} is al only to þe lynage of mankynde ryȝt as i{n}telligence is oonly þe 4900 deuyne nature. [Sidenote: Hence His (i. e. God’s) knowledge exceeds all other, comprehending both what belongs to His own nature, and what is comprehended by all inferior creatures.] of whiche it folweþ þat þilke knowyng is more worþe þan [th]is[e] oþer. syn it knoweþ by hys p{ro}pre nature nat only hys subiect. as who seiþ it ne [[pg 169]] knoweþ nat al oonly þat app{er}teiniþ p{ro}prely to hys 4904 knowynge. but it knoweþ þe subgitȝ of alle oþer knowynges. [Linenotes: 4873 [_yif_]--from C. 4878 [_or the_]--from C. _suffraunce_--MS. suffisau{n}ce, C. suffraunce 4879-80 [_goth----suffraunce_]--from C. 4883 _seid_--MS. seide, C. seyd 4887 _quit_--quite 4888 _hys_--hise 4889 _discernynge_--MS. discryuyng, C. discernynge _from_--fro 4893-94 _witte_--wit 4895 _mowen_--mowe _here ne þere_--her {and} ther 4901 _whiche_--which 4902 _[th]is[e] oþer_--thise oothr{e}] [Headnote: THE POWERS OF SENSE AND IMAGINATION.] [Sidenote: But how shall it be then, if sense and imagination oppose reason, affirming that the general idea of things, which reason thinks it so perfectly sees, is nothing?] but how shal it þan be yif þat wit {and} ymaginac{i}ou{n} stryuen aȝeins resonynge {and} sein þat of þilke vniuersel þinges. þat resou{n} weneþ to seen þat it nis 4908 ryȝt nauȝt. [Sidenote: For what falls under the cognisance of the senses and imagination cannot be general.] for wit {and} ymaginac{i}ou{n} seyn þat þat. þat is sensible or ymaginable it ne may nat ben vniuersel. þan is eiþer þe iugement of resou{n} [soth]. ne þat þer nis no þinge sensible. or ellys for þat resou{n} woot 4912 wel þat many þinges ben subiect to wit {and} to ymaginac{i}ou{n}. þan is þe co{n}sepc{i}ou{n} of resou{n} veyn {and} fals whiche þat lookeþ {and} co{m}p{re}hendiþ. þat þat is sensible {and} synguler as uniuersele. [Sidenote: But if reason should answer to this--that in her idea of what is general she comprehends whatever is sensible and imaginable; but as to the senses and imagination, they cannot attain to the knowledge of what is general, since their knowledge is confined to material figures; and therefore in all real knowledge of things we must give the greatest credit to that faculty which has a more steadfast and perfect judgment of things.]