And so, we average Americans end our education in the only “conventions,” named in the Seventh or the Fifth Articles, which yet have assembled. And we end that education knowing that there is nothing anywhere in the Constitution those conventions adopted, and especially nothing in the Fifth Article, which changed the free American into a subject of any government or governments in America. Everything we have heard--and what we have repeated is but little of what we have heard--serves but to emphasize the only meaning of its “apt, precise and classic English,” the plain meaning which we got from its language when we read it at the beginning of these conventions with the Americans who made it. It is, as its author explained it, naught but a constitutional mode of procedure in which may be thereafter exercised, in a _constitutional_ manner, either the limited ability of state governments to make Articles which do not concern themselves with the infringement of individual liberty or the unlimited ability of the people themselves, the “conventions” of the kind in which we have sat, to make any Articles. The procedure prescribed for such constitutional exercise is simplicity itself to those who sit in those conventions. It is exactly the procedure just followed (up to the point where the work of any proposer of a new Article and its mode of ratification must end) by the Philadelphia Convention which drafted it and the other six Articles. The Philadelphia Convention found itself without any CONSTITUTIONAL mode of procedure in which could be evoked to exercise the existing and exclusive power of the people of America to grant any government power to infringe upon the individual liberty of the American citizens. There being no _constitutional_ mode of procedure, no designated body to draft Articles with such grants and to propose them and to ascertain and propose the _valid_ mode of ratification for them, the Philadelphia Convention did that work, guided only by basic American doctrine, the Statute of ’76 and the experience of the “conventions” which had made the national Articles of 1776. It followed a certain mode of procedure in the doing of these things, knowing and stating that to draft Articles and propose them and ascertain and propose the right mode of ratification for them is not the exercise of any power. With a knowledge which we of a later generation never should have forgotten--and which we who have been educated with them never will forget--the Philadelphia Convention knew that there were two makers of Articles in America, each of which had exercised its respective and different ability to make them, during the eleven years which preceded the Philadelphia Convention. They knew that every Article that was _national_ could be made by no one but the people themselves, the “conventions,” which had made the _national_ Articles of ’76 and which are named as the makers of all future Articles _of that kind_ in the