Seventh and the Fifth Articles proposed by Philadelphia. And so, when the Philadelphia Convention had drafted its Articles and was about to propose them, it recognized the legal necessity of ascertaining, from the nature of those Articles, whether they were in the power of both or only of one of those existing makers of Articles. In the ascertainment, with their minds on the First Article grants of national power to interfere with individual liberty, they knew that no governments in America could make an Article _of that kind_. Their ascertainment was then ended and they knew that they _must_ propose that mode of ratification which would send their Articles to the only valid ratifiers, the people themselves, the “conventions” of the Seventh and the Fifth Articles. This was the procedure they had followed, when there was no _constitutional_ mode of procedure provided. And so, with the extraordinary wisdom that characterized everything they did, that Philadelphia Convention wrote exactly the same procedure into the Fifth Article so that never again there might be lacking in America a _constitutional_ mode of procedure for the evoking and the exercise of the only power that is ever exercised when constitutional Articles are made, the power of making them. As the Philadelphia Convention ended its existence with its own proposals, some new body had to do that work, when any new Article was to be proposed. As the work of the Philadelphia Convention had not been the exercise of any power but merely the work of proposing, it was a certainty that the new _constitutional_ mode, exactly the same mode as that of Philadelphia, would also be the exercise of no power. And so, the Philadelphia Convention named the Congress (or a convention demanded by the state legislatures) to do the work of the Philadelphia Convention in drafting and proposing any new Article, and it named the Congress to perform the duty of ascertaining (by the nature of the new drafted Article) _which_ of the two makers could make it, and then to propose a mode of ratification by which it would be _validly_ ratified by such competent maker. As to the only powers ever to be exercised in the making of any new Article, the power of legislatures to make _federal_ Articles, and the exclusive power of the people or “conventions” to make _national_ Articles, the _constitutional_ mode of procedure did not (nor could it, if Americans were not to become “subjects”) give the governments any of the exclusive ability of the people or “conventions,” and it did not (nor could it, if America were to be a republic) alter the existing ability of the majority of the American people to make their governments what they will. But, for the very practical purpose which Madison so clearly explained, the purpose of providing some check upon the tyranny of the majority or an aggressive minority over the individual rights of all Americans, the Fifth Article procedure could