Hence we know of two sources for feelings of guilt: that arising
from the dread of authority and the later one from the dread of
the super-ego. The first one compels us to renounce instinctual
gratification; the other presses over and above this towards
punishment, since the persistence of forbidden wishes cannot be
concealed from the super-ego. We have also heard how the severity of
the super-ego, the rigour of conscience, is to be explained. It simply
carries on the severity of external authority which it has succeeded
and to some extent replaced. We see now how renunciation of instinctual
gratification is related to the sense of guilt. Originally, it is
true, renunciation is the consequence of a dread of external authority;
one gives up pleasures so as not to lose its love. Having made this
renunciation, one is quits with authority, so to speak; no feeling of
guilt should remain. But with the dread of the super-ego the case is
different. Renunciation of gratification does not suffice here, for the
wish persists and is not capable of being hidden from the super-ego. In
spite of the renunciations made, feelings of guilt will be experienced
and this is a great disadvantage economically of the erection of
the super-ego, or, as one may say, of the formation of conscience.
Renunciation no longer has a completely absolving effect; virtuous
restraint is no longer rewarded by the assurance of love; a threatened
external unhappiness—loss of love and punishment meted out by external
authority—has been exchanged for a lasting inner unhappiness, the
tension of a sense of guilt.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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