tacitly abandoned all pretensions to an original jurisdiction in civil suits.[41] They have however been more successful in establishing a branch of their ultimate jurisdiction, which had less to be urged for it in respect of precedent, that of hearing appeals from courts of equity. It is proved by Sir Matthew Hale and his editor, Mr. Hargrave, that the Lords did not entertain petitions of appeal before the reign of Charles I., and not perhaps unequivocally before the long parliament.[42] They became very common from that time, though hardly more so than original suits; and as they bore no analogy, except at first glance, to writs of error, which come to the House of Lords by the king's express commission under the great seal, could not well be defended on legal grounds. But on the other hand, it was reasonable that the vast power of the court of chancery should be subject to some control; and though a commission of review, somewhat in the nature of the court of delegates in ecclesiastical appeals, might have been and had been occasionally ordered by the Crown;[43] yet if the ultimate jurisdiction of the peerage were convenient and salutary in cases of common law, it was difficult to assign any satisfactory reason why it should be less so in those which are technically denominated equitable.[44] Nor is it likely that the Commons would have disputed this usurpation, in which the Crown had acquiesced, if the Lords had not received appeals against members of the other house. Three instances of this took place about the year 1675; but that of Shirley against Sir John Fagg is the most celebrated, as having given rise to a conflict between the two houses, as violent as that which had occurred in the business of Skinner. It began altogether on the score of privilege. As members of the House of Commons were exempted from legal process during the session, by the general privilege of parliament, they justly resented the pretension of the peers to disregard this immunity, and compel them to appear as respondents in cases of appeal. In these contentions neither party could evince its superiority but at the expense of innocent persons. It was a contempt of the one house to disobey its order, of the other to obey it. Four counsel, who had pleaded at the bar of the Lords in one of the cases where a member of the other house was concerned, were taken into custody of the serjeant-at-arms by the speaker's warrant. The gentleman usher of the black rod, by warrant of the Lords, empowering him to call all persons necessary to his assistance, set them at liberty. The Commons apprehended them again; and to prevent another rescue, sent them to the Tower. The Lords despatched their usher of the black rod to the lieutenant of the Tower, commanding him to deliver up the said persons. He replied that they were committed by order of the Commons, and he could not release them without their order; just as, if the Lords were to commit any persons, he could not