release them without their Lordships' order. They addressed the king to remove the lieutenant; but after some hesitation, he declined to comply with their desire. In this difficulty, they had recourse, instead of the warrant of the Lords' speaker, to a writ of habeas corpus returnable in parliament; a proceeding not usual, but the legality of which seems to be now admitted. The lieutenant of the Tower, who, rather unluckily for the Lords, had taken the other side, either out of conviction, or from a sense that the lower house were the stronger and more formidable, instead of obeying the writ, came to the bar of the Commons for directions. They voted, as might be expected, that the writ was contrary to law and the privileges of their house. But in this ferment of two jealous and exasperated assemblies, it was highly necessary, as on the former occasion, for the king to interpose by a prorogation for three months. This period, however, not being sufficient to allay their animosity, the House of Peers took up again the appeal of Shirley in their next session. Fresh votes and orders of equal intemperance on both sides ensued, till the king by the long prorogation, from November 1675 to February 1677, put an end the dispute. The particular appeal of Shirley was never revived; but the Lords continued without objection to exercise their general jurisdiction over appeals from courts of equity.[45] The learned editor of Hale's Treatise on the Jurisdiction of the Lords expresses some degree of surprise at the Commons' acquiescence in what they had treated as an usurpation. But it is evident from the whole course of proceeding that it was the breach of privilege in citing their own members to appear, which excited their indignation. It was but incidentally that they observed in a conference, "that the Commons cannot find, by Magna Charta, or by any other law or ancient custom of parliament, that your lordships have any jurisdiction in cases of appeal from courts of equity." They afterwards, indeed, resolved that there lies no appeal to the judicature of the Lords in parliament from courts of equity;[46] and came ultimately, as their wrath increased, to a vote "that whosoever shall solicit, plead, or prosecute any appeal against any commoner of England, from any court of equity, before the House of Lords, shall be deemed and taken a betrayer of the rights and liberties of the commons of England, and shall be proceeded against accordingly;"[47] which vote the Lords resolved next day to be "illegal, unparliamentary, and tending to a dissolution of the government."[48] But this was evidently rather an act of hostility arising out of the immediate quarrel than the calm assertion of a legal principle.[49]