as Professor Goodnow points out,[10] would still be left open to the electorate. By the progressive overthrow of the worse and the selection of better aspirants for political power the boss may evolve into the leader, who will retain many of the great functions of his predecessor but will exercise them in a responsible manner and free from corruption. The practical significance of Professor Goodnow’s argument, however, lies far less in the explanation it gives of the temporary ascendency of the boss and the system which he presides over than in the conviction it enforces of the necessity of certain reforms in the organisation of our government that will bring its functions into harmony with each other, and ultimately, it is hoped, make corrupt and irresponsible bosses Impossible.[11] In no proper sense of the word, however, can this line of argument be considered an apology for corruption such as is usually alleged to be associated with bossism. It makes clear only that the power of the boss, under present conditions, has its uses as well as its abuses. But these uses do not justify the abuses. On the contrary the corruption associated with the great powers of the boss is a menace so great as to make necessary the most far-reaching reforms. Whether we are soon to get rid of the boss or not we are therefore bound to fight against any corruption that may develop as a result of his rule. Our present system is manifestly unstable in the long run. Individual bosses seldom retain power any great number of years. The position of the boss may remain, but “spasms” of reform usually succeed at least in introducing a new incumbent who brings with him new methods and new groups of favourites. The net result is far from guaranteeing that certainty and stability which both business and public interests demand. Even assuming that in some way security against popular upheaval could be conferred upon the boss, other difficulties would still have to be met. The large financial interests, which need the favours of government or seek release from its burdens, sometimes go to war among themselves, and in these contests control of the powers of the boss gives valuable strategic advantages. Hence many ambitious aspirants among the principal heads of the gang, each awaiting a possible palace insurrection. It is conceivable, however, that a boss might secure himself both against factional and popular disturbances, and at the same time be supported by consolidated business interests powerful beyond the possibility of successful attack by other financial groups. With further growth of corporations and the adoption of the community of interest policy among them, the latter condition might indeed be pretty thoroughly established. In this case we would have a boss as impregnable as the conception allows. True he would still operate through democratic forms, but this pseudo-democracy of his would be nothing more than a mask for oligarchy. The system might