conceivably work out into a highly efficient and stable government. Both the boss and the financial interests behind him might prudently decide to content themselves with small percentages of profit, and otherwise insist on solid merit in both the men and the materials they employed. The disturbances due to popular uprisings on the part of an untrammeled voting mass would be reduced to a vanishing minimum. In this successful combination, however, the oligarchy and not the boss would be the dominating factor. Indeed even under existing conditions the title of boss is a singularly inappropriate one in most instances. Unless the bearer is possessed of financial ability of a high order himself he must remain a lieutenant rather than a leader. Usually he does not possess this ability. Nor is the reason hard to perceive. The boss is, and probably will continue to be, a specialist in one line only, namely, political manipulation; and in his extremely exposed position this work is quite sufficient in detail and variety to absorb all the time and talents even of an extraordinarily gifted person. Under the financial oligarchy, therefore, the boss will probably be nothing more than an agent, a departmental head charged with the duty of securing the necessary majority of the popular vote at all elections and of retaining control of office holders. From this point of view the absurdity of the conception of the boss as the saviour of democracy is again apparent. At bottom his function is to secure power through his knowledge and subtle bribery of the people and to sell or lease this power to financial interests which recoup themselves out of the pockets of the people. Instead of being the saviour of democracy the net effect of his work, little perhaps as he realises it, is the selling out of democracy to oligarchy.