Demobilization : $b our industrial and military demobilization after the armistice, 1918-1920Crowell, Benedict
History
Demobilization : $b our industrial and military demobilization after the armistice, 1918-1920
Crowell, Benedict
United States. Army. American Expeditionary Forces -- Demobilization; World War, 1914-1918 -- United States
No considerations of future reserves of finished materials affected the
demobilization of the extensive war industry which was manufacturing
our rifles, machine guns, pistols, and the ammunition for them. The
production of these articles had been so successful that the moment
the war ended the supplies on hand were sufficient for the permanent
Army for years to come, with reserve supplies heavy enough to arm
a large field force. The interests of the Army, considered alone,
therefore, demanded the immediate cessation after the armistice of
all this manufacture; but economic considerations and the dictates of
good business practice made it expedient to taper off this production
gradually, even at the cost of producing more materials than the War
Department could possibly use.
Special problems arose in the liquidation of this great industry. In
the first place, the factories which made rifles and machine guns were
sharply specialized for just this work, making it difficult for them
to turn to any commercial production with the same equipment. Several
of these plants were specially created for the war work, and therefore
had no prewar occupation to which they could turn. It was necessary
for them either to close out entirely (as the Eddystone rifle plant of
the Midvale Steel & Ordnance Company near Philadelphia actually did
do) or to develop some new product. Two of the small-arms plants after
the armistice added departments for the manufacture of ball bearings,
one went into the production of automobile accessories and sporting
arms, and a fourth (which had made bayonets) took up the manufacture of
cutlery. It was necessary to give these concerns time to work out these
conversions, if an acute problem in unemployment were to be avoided.
The sharp centralization of the small-arms industry in the East was
another factor which influenced the Government to permit an unwelcome
production after the armistice. Most of the rifles, for instance, were
manufactured within a small area in the state of Connecticut. The
Winchester plant at New Haven employed 20,000 operatives, the Remington
plant at Bridgeport 12,000, and there were several others of this size.
To close them all up forthwith would have created a bad industrial
situation in this busy and prosperous section of New England.
The policy adopted, therefore, was to taper off the production of such
materials. Upon the signing of the armistice ten American plants were
engaged exclusively in the production of automatic arms. They employed
20,000 persons. They had reached a daily output of more than 1,100
machine guns and automatic rifles on contracts calling for the delivery
of 650,000 such weapons, at a projected cost of $193,000,000, of which
465,000 guns were as yet undelivered. The final cancellations stopped
the production of 382,000 guns, making the total war production 268,000
guns. In the various plants the Government had invested $11,000,000 in
machinery.
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