But most important of all was a liberty suggested by that system to the Muslim jurisconsults. This was through the part played in the older school by the _Responsa Prudentium_, answers by prominent lawyers to questions put to them by their clients, in which the older law of the Twelve Tables was expounded, expanded, and often practically set aside by their comments. Sir Henry Maine thus states the situation: “The authors of the new jurisprudence, during the whole progress of its formation, professed the most sedulous respect for the letter of the code. They were merely explaining it, deciphering it, bringing out its full meaning; but then, in the result, by placing texts together, by adjusting the law to states of fact which actually presented themselves, and by speculating on its possible application to others which might occur, by introducing principles of interpretation derived from the exegesis of other written documents which fell under their observation, they educed a vast variety of canons which had never been dreamt of by the compilers of the Twelve Tables, and which were in truth rarely or never to be found there.” All this precisely applies to the development of law in Islam. [Sidenote: EQUITY; LEGAL FICTION] The part of the Twelve Tables was taken by the statute law of the Qur’an and the case law derived from the Usage of Muhammad; that of the Roman _Iurisprudentes_ by those speculative jurists who worked mostly outside of al-Madina in the camp cities of Mesopotamia and Syria—the very name for lawyer in Arabic, _faqih_, plural _fuqaha_, is a translation of _prudens_, _prudentes_; and that of the _Responsa_, the answers, by the “Opinion” which they claimed as a legitimate legal method and source. Further, the validity of a general agreement of jurisconsults “reminds us of the rescript of Hadrian, which ordains that, if the opinions of the licensed _prudentes_ all agreed, such common opinion had the force of statute; but if they disagreed, the judge might follow which he chose.” The Arabic term, _ra’y_, here rendered Opinion, has passed through marked vicissitudes of usage. In old Arabic, before it, in the view of some, began to keep bad company, it meant an opinion that was thoughtful, weighed and reasonable, as opposed to a hasty dictate of ill-regulated passion. In that sense it is used in a tradition—probably forged—handed down from Muhammad. He was sending a judge to take charge of legal affairs in al-Yaman, and asked him on what he would base his legal decisions. “On the Qur’an,” he replied. “But if that contains nothing to the purpose?” “Then upon your usage.” “But if that also fails you?” “Then I will follow my own opinion.” And the Prophet approved his purpose. A similar tradition goes back to Umar, the first Khalifa, and it, too, is probably a later forgery, written to defend this source of law. But, with the revolt against the use of Opinion, to which we shall