What, then, is this dialogue? Formally defined it includes, I suppose, any conversation――any talk in which two or more persons take part; while it excludes a monologue, which one delivers while others listen, and a soliloquy, which one delivers when there is nobody to listen――unless, perchance, behind the arras. But some dialogues are, if I may coin a word, much more thoroughly dialogic than others――there is much more of what is the real essence of the matter. That real essence I take to be the meeting of minds in talk――the reciprocal exhibition of mind to mind. The most famous compositions in the world to which the title of dialogues is expressly given――Plato’s own――vary greatly in this essential quality. Some have it in a high degree: others become in great measure merely an exposition, punctuated by assents or admissions which tend to become almost purely a matter of form. Later philosophical dialogues, like Landor’s, give, to my mind, even less the impression of conversation――though an exception may well be made to some extent for Mr. Mallock’s _New Republic_. But speeches are not true dialogue, and you cannot make them such by putting in a succession of them. For an instance, see Mr. Lowes Dickinson’s _Modern Symposium_. One is inclined to say that unstinted liberty of interruption is essential to the full nature of dialogue――to give it its true character of reciprocity, of exchange, and often of combat. Without that it inclines towards the monologue――towards an exposition by one, and away from a contribution by several.