The keynote was sounded in that very speech of 1862, when he repeated what he had often before objected to the robust Lord Palmerston’s frequently flustering methods, but added that “... we should be vigilant to guard and prompt to vindicate the honour of the country.” On an earlier occasion, he laid stress on the diplomatic duty of “... if necessary, saying rough things kindly, and not kind things roughly;” while from first to last, however, as head of opposition, he disapproved a foreign policy which landed us in superfluous engagements, he always supported the Government when the crisis became really national. In 1864, criticising the Palmerstonian management of the Danish imbroglio, he remarked: “... I am not for war. I can contemplate with difficulty the combination of circumstances which can justify war in the present age _unless the honour of the country is likely to suffer_.” Two more of his ruling principles were, first, that the ripe moment is half the battle in national attitude towards distant complications; and second, the importance, under our system, of distinguishing between what a minister, backed by a large parliamentary majority, decides in home and in foreign affairs. His prescient criticisms on both the source and the course of the Crimean War illustrate the one; his deliverance, in a speech of May, 1855--a speech prescribing a most statesmanlike policy towards both Russia and Turkey, part only of which[121] he was able more than twenty years later to execute, the other: “... A minister may, by the aid of a parliamentary majority, support unjust laws, and ... a political system which a quarter of a century afterwards may, by the aid of another parliamentary majority, be condemned. The passions, the prejudices, and the party spirit that flourish in a free country may support and uphold him.... But when you come to foreign politics things are very different. Every step that you take is an irretrievable one.... You cannot rescind your policy.... If you make a mistake in foreign affairs; if you enter into unwise treaties; ... if the scope and tendency of your foreign system are founded on a want of information or false information, ... there is no majority in the House of Commons which can long uphold a Government under such circumstances. It will not make a Government strong, but it will make this House weak....”