Throughout, his policy was that of confederation, not annexation; of “scientific frontiers” safeguarding ascertained “spheres of influence;” of binding, not loosing; of a strong front but a soft mien; of persuasion, if possible, rather than compulsion--as he always recommended in framing measures to protect labour and improve society; of a straight line steadfastly pursued, instead of wobble, worry, and flurry; first beating the air, and then--a retreat; at once headstrong and weak-kneed. Although his “Imperialism” was by no means that which has occasionally since usurped the name, assuredly, in upholding the burden of Great Britain’s destiny, he would never have recoiled from “the too vast orb of her fate.” Disraeli’s imperialism was not the bastard and braggart sort that he once styled “rowdy rhetoric;” nor the official sort to which he sarcastically alluded when Lord Palmerston, in 1855, took credit for accepting Lord John Russell’s resignation, and was “ready to stand or fall by him:” “The noble Lord is neither standing nor falling, but, on the contrary, he has remained sitting on the Treasury bench.” Associated with it, lay a deep sense of obligation in the choice of high character, ability, and spirit to carry it out; the sense too that a momentary mistake should never sacrifice excellent proconsuls to the “hare-brained chatter of irresponsible frivolity;” the resolve also never to shirk responsibility by making scapegoats. And, beyond all, a feeling that in dealing even with semi-barbarous nations, it was neither magnanimous, wise, nor dignified to crush them utterly, and that their feelings, prejudices, and customs ought to be respected. Perhaps no better example could be given than his attitude regarding the events of 1879 in South Africa. The Zulus had threatened and harassed an impoverished and resourceless Transvaal. The Transvaal had requested and obtained “annexation” from Great Britain. But the Zulu chief, irritated by the suppression of the “suzerainty” arrogated by him over the Boer lands, began to beset the Natal borders. The Governor of Natal was for appeasing them. Sir Bartle Frere, however, that commanding High Commissioner of South Africa, took an opposite view, and favoured a course unmistakable for weakness. In his conferences with Cetchwayo he made requisitions, on his own initiative, exceeding his instructions from home. The result was war, with the disaster of Isandhlwana, the rally of Rorke’s Drift, and eventual success. During March the matter was brought before the House of Lords in a form arranged to censure the Government policy, but so worded as to restrict the debate to the advisability of Sir Bartle Frere’s recall on the ground of his unauthorised ultimatum.