In this case the inducement of interest will undoubtedly be necessary to bring about saving. As between equal amounts of satisfaction at different times, the average person will certainly prefer those of the present to those of the future. He will not decide in favour of the future unless the satisfactions then obtainable are to be greater in quantity. To this situation the rule that deferred enjoyments are worth less than present enjoyments, is strictly applicable. The increased quantity of future satisfaction which is necessary to turn the choice from the present to the future, and to determine that the surplus shall be saved rather than spent, can be provided only through interest. In this way the accumulations of interest and savings will make the future fund equivalent to a larger amount of enjoyment or utility than could be obtained if the surplus were exchanged for the goods of the present. "Interest magnifies the distant object." Whenever this magnifying power seems sufficiently great to outweigh the advantage of present over future satisfactions, the surplus will be saved instead of spent. Among the well-to-do there is probably a considerable number of persons who take this attitude toward a considerable part of their savings. Since they would not make these savings without the inducement of interest, they regard the latter as a necessary compensation for the sacrifice of postponed enjoyment. In a general way we may say that they have a strict right to this interest on the intrinsic ground of sacrifice. Inasmuch as the community benefits by the savings, it may quite as fairly be required to pay for the antecedent sacrifices of the savers as for the inconvenience undergone by the performer of any useful labour or service. Summing up the matter regarding the intrinsic justification of interest, we find that the titles of productivity and service do not conclusively establish the strict right of the capitalist to interest, and that the title of abstinence is morally valid for only a portion, probably a rather small portion, of the total amount of interest now received by the owners of capital. Consequently interest as a whole is not conclusively vindicated on individual grounds. If it is to be proved morally lawful its justification must be sought in extrinsic and social considerations. This inquiry will form the subject of the next chapter. FOOTNOTES: [133] Hohoff, "Die Bedeutung der Marxschen Kapitalkritik"; Paderborn, 1908. [134] Pp. 64-67, 88, 89, 96. [135] Cf. Van Roey, "De Justo Auctario ex Contractu Crediti"; and Ashley, "English Economic History." [136] Encyclical, "Vix Pervenit," 1745. [137] Cf. St. Thomas, "Summa Theologica," 2a 2ae, q. 78, a. 2 et 3. [138] "Secunda Secondae," q. 77, a. 1, in corp. [139] "Theologia Moralis," I, no. 1050. [140] "What is Capital?" p. 27. [141] "Political Economy," p. 507. CHAPTER XIII SOCIAL AND PRESUMPTIVE JUSTIFICATIONS OF INTEREST