Distributive Justice: The Right and Wrong of Our Present Distribution of WealthRyan, John A. (John Augustine)
PhilosophyChristian
Distributive Justice: The Right and Wrong of Our Present Distribution of Wealth
Ryan, John A. (John Augustine)
Economic history; Income distribution -- Moral and ethical aspects; Wealth -- Religious aspects
As we saw in the last chapter, interest cannot be conclusively
justified on the ground of either productivity or service. It is
impossible to demonstrate that the capitalist has a strict right to
interest because his capital produces interest, or because it renders
a service to the labourer or the consumer. A part, probably a small
part, of the interest now received can be fairly justified by the
title of sacrifice. Some present owners of capital would not have
saved had they not expected to receive interest. In their case
interest may be regarded as a just compensation for the sacrifice that
they underwent when they decided to save instead of consuming.
_Limitations of the Sacrifice Principle_
Nevertheless these men would suffer no injustice if interest were now
to be abolished. Up to the moment of the change, they would have been
in receipt of adequate compensation; thereafter, they would be in
exactly the same position as when they originally chose to save rather
than consume. They would still be able to sell their capital, and
convert the proceeds to their immediate uses and pleasures. In this
case they would obviously have no further claim upon the community for
interest. On the other hand, they could retain the ownership of their
capital, and postpone its consumption to some future time. In making
this choice they would regard future as more important than present
consumption, and the superiority of future enjoyment as sufficiently
great to compensate them for the sacrifice of postponement. Hence
they would have no moral claim to interest on the ground of
abstinence. In general, then, the sacrifice-justification of interest
continues only so long as the interest continues. It extends only to
the interest received by certain capitalists in certain circumstances,
not to all interest in all circumstances. Therefore, it presents no
moral obstacle to the complete abolition of interest.
Since probably the greater part of the interest now received cannot be
justified on intrinsic grounds, and since that part of it which is
thus justified could be abolished consistently with the rights of the
recipients, let us see whether it is capable of justification for
reasons of social welfare. Would its suppression be socially
beneficial or socially detrimental?
_The Value of Capital in a No-Interest Régime_
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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