Distributive Justice: The Right and Wrong of Our Present Distribution of WealthRyan, John A. (John Augustine)
PhilosophyChristian
Distributive Justice: The Right and Wrong of Our Present Distribution of Wealth
Ryan, John A. (John Augustine)
Economic history; Income distribution -- Moral and ethical aspects; Wealth -- Religious aspects
On the other hand, there would be certain and serious disadvantages. A
considerable number of land users might permit their holdings to
deteriorate through careless cultivation. To be sure, they would not
find this a profitable course if they intended to remain on the land
permanently; but they might prefer to exhaust the best qualities of a
farm in a few years, and then retire, or go into some other business,
or repeat the wearing-out process on other lands. Thus the community
would suffer through the lowered productiveness of its land, and
because of the lower rent that it would receive from all subsequent
users of the deteriorated tracts. In the second place, the
administrative machinery required to levy and collect the rent, and to
apportion the different holdings among competitive bidders, would
inevitably involve a vast amount of error, inequality, favouritism,
and corruption. For the land tax to be levied and collected would not
be, as now, a fraction of the rental value, but the full amount of the
annual rent. In the third place, cultivators would not have the
inducement to make improvements which arises from the hope of selling
both the improvements and the land at a profit, owing to the increased
demand for the land. Perhaps the greatest disadvantage of the system
would be the instability of tenure, with regard to both productive and
residential lands. Owing to misfortunes of various kinds, for example,
one or two bad crops, many cultivators would be temporarily unable to
pay the full amount of the land tax or rent. It is scarcely
conceivable that the State would remit the deficiency, or refuse to
turn the land over to other persons on terms more advantageous to
itself. Inasmuch as the value and rent of land would be continuously
adjusted by competition, the more efficient and more wealthy would
frequently supplant the less efficient and the less wealthy, even
though the latter had occupied their holdings or their dwellings for a
great number of years. Legal security of tenure, though theoretically
the same as that enjoyed by the private owner to-day, would be much
less effective practically. In this respect land users would be in
almost as bad a case as renters are at present.[33]
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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