3. Edwards represents the relation between motives and acts of Will, as being the same in _kind_ as that which exists between _causes_ and _effects_ among external material substances. The former relation he designates by the words _moral necessity_; the latter, by that of natural, or _philosophical_, or _physical necessity_. Yet he says himself, that the difference expressed by these words "does not lie so much in the nature of the _connection_ as in the two terms _connected_." The qualifying terms used, then, designate merely the nature of the antecedents and consequents, while the nature of the connection between them is, in all instances, the same, that of naked necessity. 4. Edwards himself represents moral necessity as just as absolute as physical, or natural necessity. "Moral necessity may be," he says, "as absolute as natural necessity. That is, the effect may be as perfectly connected with its moral cause as a natural necessary effect is with its natural cause." 5. Necessitarians represent the relation between motives and acts of Will as that of _cause_ and _effect_; and for this reason necessary. "If," says Edwards, "every act of Will is excited by some motive, then that motive is the _cause_ of that act of Will." "And if volitions are properly the effects of their motives, then they are _necessarily_ connected with their motives." Now as the relation of cause and effect is necessary, in the sense of the term Necessity as above defined, Edwards must hold, and design to teach, that all acts of Will are necessary in this sense. 6. Necessitarians represent the connection between motives and acts of Will as being, in all instances, the same in kind as that which exists between volitions and external actions. "As external actions," says President Day, "are directed by the Will, so the Will itself is directed by influence." Now all admit, that the connection between volitions and external actions is necessary in this sense, that when we will such action it cannot but take place. No other act is, in the circumstances, possible. In the same sense, according to Necessitarians, is every act of Will necessarily connected with influence, or motives. We do Necessitarians no wrong, therefore, when we impute to them the doctrine of Necessity as here defined. In all cases of sin, they hold, that an individual is in circumstances in which none but sinful acts of Will are possible, and these he cannot but put forth; and that in these identical circumstances the sinner is under obligation infinite to put forth different and opposite acts. THE TERM, CERTAINTY, AS USED BY NECESSITARIANS.