II. We are prepared for another important inquiry, to wit: whether the words, _certainty_, _moral certainty_, &c., as used by Necessitarians, are identical in their meaning with that of Necessity as above defined? The doctrine of Necessity would never be received by the public at all, but for the language in which it is clothed, language which prevents the public seeing it as it is. At one time it is called Moral, in distinction from Natural Necessity. At another, it is said to be nothing but Certainty, or moral Certainty, &c. Now the question arises, what is this Certainty? Is it or is it not, real Necessity, and nothing else? That it is, I argue, 1. From the fact, as shown above, that there can possibly be no Certainty, which does not fall either under the relation of Liberty or Necessity as above defined. The Certainty of Necessitarians does not, according to their own showing, fall under the former relation: it must, therefore, fall under the latter. It must be naked Necessity, and nothing else. 2. While they have defined the term Necessity, and have not that of Certainty, they use the latter term as avowedly synonymous with the former. The latter, therefore, must be explained by the former, and not the former by the latter. 3. The Certainty which they hold is a certainty which avowedly excludes the possibility of different and opposite acts of Will under the influences, or motives, under which particular acts are put forth. The Certainty under consideration, therefore, is not necessity of a particular kind, a necessity consistent with liberty and moral obligation. It is the Necessity above defined, in all its naked deformity.