The impartial, uncommitted spectator, on the other hand, perceives most distinctly the same identical absurdities in both these theories. He knows perfectly, that it can make no essential difference, whether God produces a result directly, or by giving existence to a constitution and influences from which it cannot but arise. If one theory involves injustice and tyranny, the other must involve the same. Let me here add, that the reprobation with which each of the classes above named regards the sentiments of the other, is a sentence of reprobation passed (unconsciously to be sure) upon the doctrine of Necessity itself which is common to both. For if this one element is taken out of either theory, there is nothing left to render it abhorrent to any mind. It is thus that Necessitarians themselves, without exception, pass sentence of condemnation upon their own theory, by condemning it, in every system in which they meet with it except their own. There is not a man on earth, that has not in some form or other passed sentence of reprobation upon this system. Let any man, whatever, contemplate any theory but the one he has himself adopted, any theory that involves this element, and he will instantly fasten upon this one feature as the characteristic which vitiates the whole theory, and renders it deserving of universal reprobation. It is thus that unsophisticated Nature expresses her universal horror at a system which "Binding nature fast in fate, Enslaves the human Will." Unsophisticated Nature abhors this doctrine infinitely more than she was ever conceived to abhor a vacuum. Can a theory which the universal Intelligence thus agrees in reprobating, as involving the most horrid absurdity and tyranny conceivable, be the only true one? CHAPTER IV. EXTENT AND LIMITS OF THE LIBERTY OF THE WILL. WHILE it is maintained, that, in the sense defined in the preceding chapter, the Will is free, it is also affirmed that, in other respects, it is not free at all. It should be borne distinctly in mind, that, in the respects in which the Will is subject to the law of Liberty, its liberty is absolute. It is in no sense subject to the law of Necessity. So far, also, as it is subject to the law of Necessity, it is in no sense free. What then are the extent and limits of the Liberty of the Will? 1. In the absence of Motives, the Will cannot act at all. To suppose the opposite would involve a contradiction. It would suppose the action of the Will in the direction of some object, in the absence of all objects towards which such action can be directed. 2. The Will is not free in regard to what the Motives presented shall be, in view of which its determinations shall be formed. Motives exist wholly independent of the Will. Nor does it depend at all upon the Will, what Motives shall be presented for its election. It is free only in respect to the particular determinations it shall put forth, in reference to the Motives actually presented.