3. Whenever a Motive, or object of choice, is presented to the mind, the Will is necessitated, by the presentation of the object, to act in some direction. It must yield or refuse to yield to the Motive. But such refusal is itself a positive act. So far, therefore, the Will is wholly subject to the law of Necessity. It is free, not in respect to whether it shall, or shall not, choose at all when a Motive is presented; but in respect to _what_ it shall choose. I, for example, offer a merchant a certain sum, for a piece of goods. Now while it is equally possible for him to receive or reject the offer, one or the other determination he _must_ form. In the first respect, he is wholly free. In the latter, he is not free in any sense whatever. The same holds true in respect to all objects of choice presented to the mind. Motive necessitates the Will to act in some direction; while, in all deliberate Moral Acts at least, it leaves either of two or more different and opposite determinations equally possible to the mind. 4. Certain particular volitions may be rendered necessary by other, and what may be termed _general_, determinations. For example, a determination to pursue a particular course of conduct, may render necessary all particular volitions requisite to carry this general purpose into accomplishment. It renders them necessary in this sense, that if the former does exist, the latter must exist. A man, for example, determines to pass from Boston to New York with all possible expedition. This determination remaining unchanged, all the particular volitions requisite to its accomplishment cannot but exist. The general and controlling determination, however, may, at any moment, be suspended. To perpetuate or suspend it, is always in the power of the Will. 5. I will here state a conjecture, viz.: that there are in the primitive developments of mind, as well as in all primary acts of attention, certain necessary spontaneities of the Will, as well as of other powers of the mind. Is it not in consequence of such actions, that the mind becomes first conscious of the power of volition, and is it not now necessary for us under certain circumstances to give a certain degree of attention to phenomena which appear within and around us? My own convictions are, that such circumstances often do occur. Nor is such a supposition inconsistent with the great principle maintained in this Treatise. This principle is, that Liberty and Accountability, in other words, Free, and Moral Agency, are co-extensive.