A singular instance of reasoning in a circle on the part of Necessitarians, in respect to what they call the _strongest Motive_, demands a passing notice here. One of their main arguments in support of their doctrine is based upon the assumption, that the action of the Will is always in the direction of the strongest Motive. When, however, we ask them, which is the strongest Motive, their reply in reality is, that it is the Motive in the direction of which the Will does act. "The strength of a _Motive_," says President Day, "is not its prevailing, but the power by which it prevails. Yet we may very properly _measure_ this power by the actual result." Again, "We may measure the comparative strength of Motives of different kinds, from the results to which they lead; just as we learn the power of different causes, from the effects which they produce:" that is, we are not to determine, _a priori_, nor by an appeal to consciousness, which of two or more Motives presented is the strongest. We are to wait till the Will does act, and then assume that the Motive, in the direction of which it acts, is the strongest. From the action of the Will in the direction of that particular Motive, we are finally to infer the truth of the doctrine of Necessity. The strongest Motive, according to the above definition, is the motive to which the Will does yield. The argument based upon the truism, that the Will always acts in the direction of this Motive, that is, the Motive towards which it does act, the argument, I say, put into a logical form, would stand thus. If the action of the Will is always in the direction of the strongest Motive, that is, if it always follows the Motive it does follow, it is governed by the law of Necessity. Its action is always in the direction of this Motive, that is, it always follows the Motive it does follow. The Will is therefore governed by the law of Necessity. How many philosophers and theologians have become "rooted and grounded" in the belief of this doctrine, under the influence of this sophism, a sophism which, in the first instance, assumes the doctrine as true, and then moves round in a vicious circle to demonstrate its truth. CHAPTER V. THE GREATEST APPARENT GOOD. SECTION I. WE now come to a consideration of one of the great questions bearing upon our personal investigations--the proposition maintained by Necessitarians, as a chief pillar of their theory, that "_the Will always is as the greatest apparent good_." PHRASE DEFINED. The first inquiry which naturally arises here is What is the proper meaning of this proposition? In reply, I answer, that it must mean one of these three things. 1. That the Will is always, in all its determinations, conformed to the dictates of the Intelligence, choosing those things only which the Intelligence affirms to be best. Or,