Elements of metaphysicsTaylor, A. E. (Alfred Edward)
Philosophy
Elements of metaphysics
Taylor, A. E. (Alfred Edward)
Metaphysics
What the fundamental distinction between the supreme individual whole
and the lesser individuals must be taken to consist in we shall discuss
in our next chapter. Meanwhile we may note two points:—(1) The important
thing about an individual is not its mere numerical unity, but its
qualitative uniqueness. Any experience which we can pronounce to be
individual must be called so, not merely because it is numerically one
and not many, but because it is the consistent and harmonious embodiment
of a coherent purpose. Numerically considered, every such individual is
necessarily many as well as one, precisely because it is a system. This
applies especially to the supreme or absolute individual, the complete
system of experience. It is individual primarily not because it is
numerically one, but because it is the complete expression of a coherent
idea or purpose. It has been the defect of too many monistic theories to
overlook this, and to lay the main stress on the numerical oneness of
the real.
(2) An experience individual in the sense already explained is what we
mean by a “spirit.” Spirit cannot be properly defined by
contradistinction from a supposed non-spiritual reality, such as
“matter,” for such a definition would only amount to the assertion that
spirit is what is not other than spirit; and would tell us nothing of
the term to be defined. Nor, again, is spirit properly defined as a
series of states or modifications of the abstraction “consciousness.”
The positive characteristic by which spiritual existence may be
recognised is that in it the _what_ and the _that_ are combined in the
unity of immediate feeling. And immediate feeling, as we have seen, is
essentially teleological. Where you have a connected system of factors
which can only be understood as a whole by reference to an explicit or
implicit end, which constitutes their unity, you have spirit, and where
you have spirit you have such a system. So that to call reality an
individual of individuals is the same thing as to say that it is a
spiritual system of which the elements, constituents, or terms, are in
their turn spiritual systems.[62] Our doctrine may thus be seen to be
fairly entitled to the name Idealism, which current usage has
appropriated to the view that all existence is ultimately mental.
§ 7. Such a relation as we have asserted between the individual whole of
Reality and the elements or terms within the whole is necessarily
unique, and cannot be adequately illustrated from any less perfect type
of systematic unity recognised by everyday or by scientific thought. In
particular, we must carefully avoid the mistake of conceiving the
relation of the elements to the totality in a mechanical way as that of
“parts” to a “whole of parts”; or, again, in a merely biological way, as
that of “members” to an organism. All such analogies lose sight of the
intimate character of a union in which the elements and the totality
exist not merely in and through, but also for each other.
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