Elements of metaphysicsTaylor, A. E. (Alfred Edward)
Philosophy
Elements of metaphysics
Taylor, A. E. (Alfred Edward)
Metaphysics
§ 5. This last statement will possibly appear startling to the reader
who is unacquainted with the history of metaphysical investigations into
Causality. But it is easy to show that it is really the expression of an
obvious truth. For the causal principle, as we have just seen, is an
imperfect expression of the really axiomatic principle of Sufficient
Reason or Ground and Consequence. And it is readily seen that the
expression it gives to that principle, because imperfect, must be
partially false. What the principle of Ground and Consequence says is,
that the whole of existence is a single coherent system in which every
part is determined by the nature of the whole as revealed in the
complete system. But if this is true, each constituent of the system can
only be completely determined by its connections with all the rest. No
constituent can be entirely determined by its relations to a lesser part
of the whole system, in the way presupposed by the notion of one-sided
causal dependence. The “cause” must, if the principle of Ground and
Consequence be valid, be determined by the “effect” no less than the
“effect” by the “cause.” And therefore the causal postulate cannot be
the whole truth.
How this fatal logical defect in the principle of Causation makes itself
felt in the logic of the inductive sciences, and how logicians have
sought without success to avoid it, we shall incidentally see as our
discussion proceeds. At present we must be content to note that, owing
to this flaw, Causation, wherever it is asserted, can only be Appearance
and never complete Reality, and that no science which works with the
concepts of cause and effect can give us the highest truth. Of course,
the logical defects of the concept need not impair its practical
usefulness. Though it can never, for the reason given already, be
ultimately true that any event is absolutely determined by antecedent
events, the assumption may be sufficiently near the truth to yield
useful deductions as to the course of occurrences, precisely as a
mathematical approximation to the value of a surd quantity may, without
being the exact truth, be close enough for practical use. Also, it might
well be the case that the causal postulate approximates more nearly to
the truth in some spheres of investigation than in others, a
consideration which is not without its bearing on the ethical problems
of freedom and responsibility.
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