Elements of metaphysicsTaylor, A. E. (Alfred Edward)
Philosophy
Elements of metaphysics
Taylor, A. E. (Alfred Edward)
Metaphysics
Similarly with conceptual time. Here, as there is only one dimension,
the difficulty is less obvious, but it is no less real. In conceptual
time there is absolutely no means of distinguishing before from after,
past from future. For the past means the direction of our memories, the
direction qualified by the feeling of “no longer”; the future is the
direction of anticipation and purposive adaptation, the direction of
“not yet.” And, apart from the reference given by immediate feeling to
the purposive life of an individual subject, these directions cannot be
discriminated. In short, conceptual time and space are essentially
relative, because they are systems of relations which have no meaning
apart from qualitative differences in the terms which they relate; while
yet again, for the purpose of the conceptual construction which yields
them, the terms have to be taken as having no character but that which
they possess in right of the relations.[148]
One other feature of the space and time construction is sufficiently
important to call for special mention. Space and time are commonly
thought of as _unities_ of some kind. All spatial positions, it is
usually assumed, fall within one system of space-relations; all dates
have their place in one all-inclusive time. This character of unity
completes the current conception of the spatial and temporal order. Each
of those orders is a unity, including all possible spatial or temporal
positions; each is an endless, infinite, continuous series of positions,
which all are purely relative. There are other peculiarities, especially
of the current concepts of space, with which it is not necessary to deal
here, as they are of an accidental kind, not arising out of the
essential nature of the process by which the conception is constructed.
Thus it is probably a current assumption that the number of dimensions
in space is three and no more, and again that the Euclidean postulate
about parallels is verified by its constitution. As far as perceptual
space is concerned, those assumptions depend, I presume, upon empirical
verification; there seems to be no reason why they should be made for
the conceptual space-order, since it is quite certain that a coherent
science of spatial relations can be constructed without recourse to
them.[149]
§ 5. The question now is, whether the whole of this spatial and temporal
construction is more than imperfect, and therefore contradictory,
appearance. I will first state in a general form the arguments for
regarding it as appearance, and then proceed to reinforce this
conclusion by dealing with some special difficulties. Finally, I propose
to ask whether we can form some positive conception of the higher order
of Reality of which the spatial and temporal series are phenomenal.
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