Elements of metaphysicsTaylor, A. E. (Alfred Edward)
Philosophy
Elements of metaphysics
Taylor, A. E. (Alfred Edward)
Metaphysics
We thus seem driven to assert the necessary existence of a superhuman
experience to which the whole universe of being is directly present as a
complete and harmonious system. For “reality” has been seen to have no
meaning apart from presence in a sentient experience or whole of
feeling, while it has also been seen infinitely to transcend all that
can be given as directly present to any limited experience. If this
conclusion is sound, our “Absolute” can now be said to be a conscious
life which embraces the totality of existence, all at once, and in a
perfect systematic unity, as the contents of its experience. Such a
conception clearly has its difficulties; how such an all-containing
experience must be thought to be related to the realm of physical
nature, and again to our own finite experiences, are problems which we
shall have to take up in our two succeeding books. We shall find them
far from simple, and it is as well for us from the first to face the
possibility that our knowledge of the character of the absolute
experience may prove to be very limited and very tentative. That it is
we seem compelled to assert by the very effort to give a coherent
meaning to our notion of reality, but of what it is we may have to
confess ourselves largely ignorant.
But we may at least go so far as this, at the present stage of our
argument. However different an all-containing coherent experience may be
in its detailed structure from our own piecemeal and largely incoherent
experience, if it is to be experience at all, it must apprehend its
contents in the general way which is characteristic of direct experience
as such. It must take note or be aware of them, and it must—if it is to
be a direct experience at all—be aware of them as exhibiting a
structural unity which is the embodiment of a consistent plan or
purpose. We have to think of it as containing in a systematic unity not
only all the “facts” of which our various experiences have to take note,
but all the purposes which they express. Hence it is natural for us,
when we attempt to form some approximate concept of such an ultimate
experience in terms of our own conscious life, to conceive it as the
union of perfected knowledge in an indivisible whole with supreme will.
We must, however, remember that, for such an experience, precisely
because of its all-comprising character, the what and the that are
inseparable. Hence its knowledge must be of the nature of direct insight
into the individual structure of the world of fact, not of
generalisation about possibilities, and its will must have the form of a
purpose which, unlike our own, is always consciously expressed with
perfect harmony and completeness in the “facts” of which it is
aware.[35] Hence knowledge and will, involving as they do for us
discrepancy between the what and the that of experience, are not wholly
satisfactory terms by which to characterise the life of the
Absolute.[36] The most adequate analogue to such a life will probably be
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