we hear every day the eulogy of Charlotte Corday. The guiltiness of the victim does not legitimate the act of the murderer. It is both unwise and criminal to furnish hatred with such excuses." =29. The duel.=--Does the duel come under the head of legitimate self-defense? No; whatever custom and prejudice may say in its favor. 1. We must first lay aside without discussion all duels bearing on frivolous causes, and they are the largest in number. 2. In many other cases reparation may be obtained through the law, and prejudice alone can prevent having recourse to it. If I am willing to have recourse to law in a case of robbery, why should I not appeal to this same law when my honor is attacked? 3. The duel is an absurd form of justice, because it puts the offender and the one offended on the same level. It is not the guilty one that is punished; it is the awkward one. 4. Social justice has degrees of penalty in proportion to the gravity of the offense, and is applied only after a very severe examination. The aim of the duel is to apply to very unequal offenses one and the same penalty, death (Jules Simon, _Le Devoir_, IV.), or if there are any degrees, since it does not always result in death, these degrees are the effect of chance. Finally, if in a duel the parties agree to use skill enough to hurt each other as little as possible, is it not as if they confessed to the injustice and insanity of the proceeding? 5. The duel had its origin in superstition: in the _Combat of God_, in the belief, namely, that God himself would arbitrate by means of the combat, and give the victory to the innocent and strike the guilty. 6. The duel is a homicide or a suicide. It is, therefore, contrary to the duty towards others and the duty towards ourselves. Finally, the duel is contrary to the duty towards society, which forbids each to be his own judge. J. J. Rousseau, in the _Nouvelle Héloïse_, has written on the duel and suicide (see further on, Chapter xi.) a letter often quoted, of which we will briefly give the principal passages. 1. One must distinguish between real honor and apparent honor: What is there in common between the glory of killing a man and the testimony of a righteous soul? What hold can the vain opinion of others have upon true honor, the roots of which are in the depths of the heart? What! the lies of a slanderer can destroy real virtues? Do the insults of a drunkard prove that one deserves them? And can the honor of a sensible man be at the mercy of the first ruffian he meets? 2. The use of force cannot be a title to virtue: