Essays, or discourses, vol. 2 (of 4) : $b Selected from the works of Feyjoo, and translated from the SpanishFeijoo, Benito Jerónimo
Philosophy
Essays, or discourses, vol. 2 (of 4) : $b Selected from the works of Feyjoo, and translated from the Spanish
Feijoo, Benito Jerónimo
Spanish essays -- Translations into English
LII. It is true, that where the law is obscure, we have authority to
interpret and construe it in a benign sense; but in this construction,
we should not lose sight of the exigence of the public safety, nor
the dictates of natural equity: and acting in this manner, is not
clemency but justice. We may also in virtue of the principle which is
called Epeikeyan, that allows of a wise and moderate interpretation of
the law, lessen, or even in many cases omit, the penalties which the
law decrees. This also is not lenity but justice, because upon such
occasions, we are rather obliged to conform to the intention of the
legislature, than the letter of the law; and such cases frequently
occur in small offences, because, upon an examination of the nature of
these things, it often appears to the eye of Prudence, that greater
inconveniences would attend the punishing, than the tolerating
them. Following the letter of the penal law, without admitting any
exceptions, even in those cases where the legislature could not intend,
nor prudence suppose it was meant to bind, is what is called justice
in extreme, or _summum jus_, which with great reason is termed extreme
injustice; therefore, acting contrary to the letter of the law in these
instances, is likewise not clemency, but justice. Aristotle, who very
well understood the nature of things appertaining to Ethics, judges the
Epiekeyan, to be a principle, or part of justice. From all that has
been said, it may be inferred, that requesting favour or compassion of
a Judge, or supposing him capable of shewing any in the discharge of
his duty, is an absurdity, and calling things by improper names; for
if he acts according to the law, reasonably and rightly understood, he
does justice; if contrary to it, he does injustice. In what are called
_casos omissos_, and when the law is obscure, there are general rules
for interpreting it and supplying the defects, which interpretations
have the force of laws; so that there is no middle path between justice
and injustice, for a Judge to walk in; because there are no means, by
which he can act conformable to law, and contrary to law. God keep you.
ON THE IMPUNITY OF LYING.
SECT. I.
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