Essays, or discourses, vol. 2 (of 4) : $b Selected from the works of Feyjoo, and translated from the SpanishFeijoo, Benito Jerónimo
Philosophy
Essays, or discourses, vol. 2 (of 4) : $b Selected from the works of Feyjoo, and translated from the Spanish
Feijoo, Benito Jerónimo
Spanish essays -- Translations into English
I. Two common errors present themselves to me with respect to the
subject-matter of this discourse, the one theoretical, the other
practical. The theoretical is derived from lying among men being
reputed as infamous, or as a vice nearly bordering upon infamy. Let us
admit, for argument’s sake, the divisions the theologians make of a
lie, into officious, jocose, and pernicious. Let us admit also, that
a pernicious lie is reputed in the common opinion as it deserves to
be reputed, and that it is treated with all possible abhorrence, so
that those who are noted for telling lies to the prejudice of their
neighbours, are generally considered as the pests of society; but
notwithstanding all this, my remarks will be principally confined to
officious and jocose lies; that is, to such as are not intended to
injure a third person, but are only told to entertain, or because they
may be of some utility to a man’s self, or to some other person. I must
also premise, that I mean to treat this point more as a politician,
than as a moral theologian. The theologians estimate officious, and
jocose lies, as venal sins; nor should I or any one else in a moral
light, represent them blacker. But if viewed in a political light, my
sentiment is, that the common opinion is excessively favourable and
indulgent to this species of vice.
II. And what is the reason of this excessive indulgence? Why the reason
is, because this sort of lie is not considered as an affront offered to
any man. The being noted for an officious or jocose liar, does not take
from any man the honour, which in other respects is thought due to him.
A gentleman, let him tell as many of these sort of lies as he will, is
still looked upon as a gentleman; a nobleman also, notwithstanding his
being remarked for this vice, is considered as a nobleman, and a prince
as a prince. But this appears to me repugnant to all reason. Lying is
infamous, bad, and vile; and a liar is unworthy of human society; he is
an impostor, who traiterously avails himself of the good faith of other
men, in order to deceive them. The most precious intercourse among men,
is that of a frank and reciprocal communication of their souls; with
which, they in conversation lay open and disclose to each other, the
affections of their wills, the sentiments of their mind, and all that
is treasured up in their memories. Now what is a liar, but a solemn
circumventor of this inestimable commerce? what, but a deceiver, who
imposes on us delusions for realities? what but a circulator of false
money, who passes the iron of a lie for the gold of truth? and finally,
what can there be found in this man, that should excuse him from being
discarded and rejected by all others, as a nuisance to company, a vile
contaminator of conversation, and as a detestable falsifier of all
intelligence and information?
SECT. II.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account