this is begging the question from the beginning, and proving what is denied, by the same proposition which is the subject of the dispute. XXIII. The suppositions we have just made, contain all the solutions we are capable of giving, to the above argument. I say then, that I myself, and I say the same of all others, who are in my present situation and circumstances, have experimental Evidence that I am now awake: because the state of wakefulness, which consists, in the intimate and ultimate disposition of the faculties to exercise themselves in proper operations, is an object, which presents itself to my mind, with such clearness, that if I was never so desirous of doing it, I cannot entertain a doubt of my being at present in that state; nor can any other reason be required of me, nor can I give any other, for assenting to this truth; neither can I for my assent to a first principle, give any other than the beforementioned, nor alledge any other, to explain the existence of any reflection, which my soul is at present intent upon. XXIV. I will not however dissemble, that after this answer is given, there still remains a serious difficulty to surmount, which may be stated in the following manner. The experimental evidence, from whence we deduce this persuasion, is fallacious; because when we sleep and dream, we are under the same persuasion that we are awake, and our senses then represent to us, that we are engaged in actual exercises in such a manner, that if it was at that time to occur to us, to make reflection upon what we were doing, we should conceive, that we had experimental evidence of our speaking, seeing, hearing, &c. Therefore the idea that I now entertain upon reflection, that I have at present experimental evidence of my being at this instant awake, and engaged in study and writing, affords me no absolute certainty that I am not asleep, or that I am actually so employed.