XXVI. We may make use of the same reasoning, if the argument is applied to the deliriums of maniacs. Every man, who after having been deprived of his reason, comes to be restored to his senses, finds a great difference with respect to the persuasions he feels, and the clearness of the opinions he forms in a state of sanity, and those he entertained when he was mad. Mad people seldom make any reflections, either on the state of their mind, or the subject of their madness; and when they do happen to make them, are generally more or less blinded by their apprehensions; of which I myself have known some instances; and it has fallen in my way, by the force of lively representations, first to prevail on some mad people to doubt of the truth of their apprehensions, and afterwards to reason them out of them; among whom there was a nun, who had been exceedingly mad for some years, and whose life was thought to be in danger, although in reality it was not so; and I being called to administer the sacraments to her, was so happy as to reduce her mind to a state of calmness, that rendered her capable of receiving them as a penitent. This I accomplished, by using various reasonings and arguments, tending to undeceive her, and at last was so fortunate as to hit upon one, adapted to the nature of her disease, and the state of her mind, which had its effect: but in doing this, great attention should be had to the tone of the voice, and the energy and vivacity of the looks, and care should be taken, that every action should be such, as is likely to give efficacy and force to the arguments you use, in order that they should make an impression on their minds; great caution should also be used not to irritate them; and by these means, they are often brought to intervals of sense; and although it is true, that they seldom last long, still the gaining an hour of calm reason, is a matter of great importance, as it was in the case of the nun we have just mentioned. XXVII. The delicacy and curiosity of this subject, has caused me to dwell on it longer than was necessary; for I am so far from apprehending, that the arguments which are used in support of universal scepticism, will prevail with, or have any weight on the world in general, that I do not believe there ever yet was a man, who in reality was convinced by them. SECT. VI. XXVIII. The limitations with which rigid scepticism may be mitigated, are innumerable; consequently, scepticism will appear more or less absurd, according to the various exceptions with which it is corrected; but this is a matter of such extent, that to reason upon it with any degree of precision would fill a large volume. I shall therefore proceed to treat of scepticism, as confined within the line of physics, which is the point, to which I proposed at first to restrain my arguments on this subject. SECT. VII.