XXXVI. And to begin with the specific, who can deny that in this sense, we know nothing of any one entity? I defy all the philosophers to tell me what is the constituent or component physical substance, of any one of the material entities that is to be found in the universe, and will give them leave to chuse that which they have most examined. St. Basil has some words (Epist. 168. _ad Eunomium_) that are admirably applicable to this purpose, and which I shall here insert: _Itaque qui se existentium scientiam assequutum esse gloriatur, exponat nobis quomodo, quod minimum esse eorum, quæ in lucem prodierunt, natura habeat._ Let the presumptuous philosopher, who boasts of his physical knowledge, explain to us the nature of the least entity which God has created. Let him, adds the same Father, who is ostentatiously vain of having penetrated into the secrets of nature, tell us what is the nature of an ant: _Dicat formicarum nobis naturam, qui eorum, quæ in natura sunt scientiam cum fastu se prædicat assequutum._ But why should we waste time? There is not, nor ever was to this day, any one, who by means of acquired science, could penetrate the constituent or component physical substance of any living or inanimate entity; the reach of our capacities not permitting us to go further, than to distinguish by some very extrinsic accidents, one thing from another; and this mode of distinguishing, is confined principally to those we call naturalists, and rarely extends to those in the schools, who acquire the appellation of philosophers, and who generally content themselves with distinguishing some few, which they commonly do in the unhappy manner we shall proceed to point out; but when school philosophers descend to treat of specific conceptions, their philosophy is so miserable and confined, that they only attempt to give the colour of a definition to a few species of brutes, whose voice they describe by some particular name, and then explain their conception of them, by some term derived from that name; thus they call the lion a roaring animal; the dog a barking one, and the horse a neighing one; but the fish, because they are very numerous, and are for the most part mute, cannot well be comprehended within this rule, and therefore are obliged to go without a definition.