Essays: Scientific, Political, & Speculative; Vol. 2 of 3: Library Edition (1891), Containing Seven Essays not before Republished, and Various other Additions. — John Shaqi
Essays: Scientific, Political, & Speculative; Vol. 2 of 3: Library Edition (1891), Containing Seven Essays not before Republished, and Various other Additions.Spencer, Herbert
Philosophy
Essays: Scientific, Political, & Speculative; Vol. 2 of 3: Library Edition (1891), Containing Seven Essays not before Republished, and Various other Additions.
Spencer, Herbert
Philosophy; Political science; Science
here to observe is, that from familiarity with organic forms there
simultaneously arose the ideas of _simple equality_, and _equality of
relations_.
At the same time, too, and out of the same mental processes, came
the first distinct ideas of _number_. In the earliest stages, the
presentation of several like objects produced merely an indefinite
conception of multiplicity; as it still does among Australians, and
Bushmen, and Damaras, when the number presented exceeds three or four.
With such a fact before us we may safely infer that the first clear
numerical conception was that of duality as contrasted with unity. And
this notion of duality must necessarily have grown up side by side
with those of likeness and equality; seeing that it is impossible to
recognize the likeness of two things without also perceiving that
there are two. From the very beginning the conception of number must
have been, as it is still, associated with {38} likeness or equality
of the things numbered; and for the purposes of calculation, an ideal
equality of the things is assumed. Before any _absolutely true_
numerical results can be reached, it is requisite that the units be
_absolutely equal_. The only way in which we can establish a numerical
relationship between things that do not yield us like impressions, is
to divide them into parts that _do_ yield us like impressions. Two
unlike magnitudes of extension, force, time, weight, or what not, can
have their relative amounts estimated, only by means of some small unit
that is contained many times in both; and even if we finally write down
the greater one as a unit and the other as a fraction of it, we state,
in the denominator of the fraction, the number of parts into which
the unit must be divided to be comparable with the fraction. It is,
indeed, true, that by a modern process of abstraction, we occasionally
apply numbers to unequal units, as the furniture at a sale or the
various animals on a farm, simply as so many separate entities; but
no exact quantitative result can be brought out by calculation with
units of this order. And, indeed, it is the distinctive peculiarity
of the calculus in general, that it proceeds on the hypothesis of
that absolute equality of its abstract units, which no real units
possess; and that the exactness of its results holds only in virtue of
this hypothesis. The first ideas of number must necessarily then have
been derived from like or equal magnitudes as seen chiefly in organic
objects; and as the like magnitudes most frequently observed were
magnitudes of extension, it follows that geometry and arithmetic had a
simultaneous origin.
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