Essays Towards a Theory of KnowledgePhilip, Alexander
Philosophy
Essays Towards a Theory of Knowledge
Philip, Alexander
Cycles; Force and energy; Knowledge, Theory of
In this argument Aristotle undoubtedly expressed a profound truth, but
it may perhaps be admitted that he rather failed to appreciate fully
the difficulty which the Platonic doctrine was designed to meet--that,
namely, of providing some sort of common nexus or unifying principle by
which the validity of Knowledge could be maintained. For he had no
certain means of showing that the potent energy of Nature was unitary
and homogeneous.
He is frequently described as a sensationalist, but such a view is
certainly incorrect. This, however, may be admitted--that he sought the
essentials of Reality not in the Mind but in the Object. It may be
fairly claimed that to this extent he occupied common ground with the
sensationalists, in that he was an adherent of the _tabula rasa_ view of
the Mind, expressed in the maxim:--
_Nihil est in intellectu quod non fuit in sensu._
* * * * *
Plato and Aristotle may be taken as typical of the two principal
intellectual tendencies which have characterised all subsequent
speculation--the Platonist, he who finds in the constitution of the Mind
the eternal principles or at least the types of the eternal principles
of Reality; the Aristotelian, he for whom these seem to reside in the
object and, in the act of Cognition, are merely impressed upon,
transferred to, presented to, or otherwise introduced into or
apprehended by the Mind.
The Aristotelian view of Nature as an energetic process failed to
impress itself upon his successors. Greek Philosophy soon after
Aristotle's death decayed or was deprived of its early vigour, and the
doctrine which survived the wreck was essentially derived, however
imperfectly, from the Platonic theory.
Throughout the first fifteen hundred years of the Christian era this
doctrine undoubtedly dominated the course of speculation--a speculation
of which much is now forgotten and almost as much was certainly barren
and unfruitful, but of which we would entertain a very mistaken notion
if we were to imagine that it was not often pursued with great subtlety
and acumen.
One natural result of the fact that such a principle dominated human
thought was the prevalence of a belief that the explanation of Nature
and natural processes could be derived from the cognitive faculty
itself. Our cognition of our immediate surroundings was doubtless
continuously corrected by immediate practical tests. But the science of
a more extended view of Nature was vitiated by this false principle and
in consequence for many centuries our whole Knowledge of Nature remained
unprogressive and unfruitful.
_Causa æquat effectum_, Nature abhors a vacuum, are examples of the
maxims derived or supposed to be derived from the necessities of our
Reason, and by the aid of which it was vainly hoped to attain a
knowledge of Nature and natural laws.
The principle was in itself unsound.
The necessary laws of our rational faculty could discover to us only the
essentials of that faculty itself.
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