[135] The context shows that this "party" may be either the individual, or a limited social group or the entire community. Even the pleasures and pains of animals, of the sentient creation generally, may come into the account. [136] These quotations are all taken from Bentham's _Principles of Morals and Legislation_; the first, third, and fourth from ch. i.; the second from ch. xiii.; and the last from ch. ii. [137] With these statements may he compared Spencer, _Principles of Ethics_, pp. 30-32: Stephen, _Science of Ethics_, pp. 42. Sidgwick, in his _Methods of Ethics_, holds that the axiomatic character of happiness as an end proves that the position is not empirical but intuitional or _a priori_. Only as we base ourselves on certain ultimate deliverances of conscience can we he said to know that happiness is the desirable end and that the happiness of one is just as intrinsically desirable as the happiness of another. (See his _Methods of Ethics_, Book III., chs. xiii. and xiv.) [138] This ambiguity affects the statement quoted from Bentham that pleasure and pain determine what we shall do. His implication is that pleasure as _object_ of desire moves us; the fact is that _present_ pleasure, aroused by the idea of some object, influences us. CHAPTER XV HAPPINESS AND SOCIAL ENDS[139] In form, the true good is thus an inclusive or expanding end. In substance, the only end which fulfills these conditions is the social good. The utilitarian standard is social consequences. To repeat our earlier quotation from Bentham (above, p. 264):