World War, 1914-1918 -- Germany; World War, 1914-1918 -- Personal narratives
"On the 18th of December last I addressed an identic note to the
Governments of the nations now at war, requesting them to state, more
definitely than they had yet been stated by either group of
belligerents, the terms upon which they would deem it possible to make
peace. I spoke on behalf of humanity and of the rights of all neutral
nations like our own, many of whose most vital interests the war puts in
constant jeopardy.
"The Central Powers united in a reply which stated merely that they were
ready to meet their antagonists in conference to discuss terms of peace.
"The Entente Powers have replied much more definitely and have stated,
in general terms indeed, but with sufficient definiteness to imply
details, the arrangements, guarantees, and acts of reparation which they
deem to be indispensable conditions of a satisfactory settlement." Here,
then, we come within sight of the first of the conditions which are
absolutely precedent, at least so far as America is concerned, to any
discussion of peace.
1. Germany must answer President Wilson's note of December 18, 1916. She
must state her terms of peace, maximum or minimum, frankly and
unequivocally.
Germany asserts that she is waging a defensive war. She must tell the
world what she is defending. That she has never been willing to do.
Germany asserts that she is victorious thus far. She must say what she
thinks her "victories" mean, and what they entitle her to claim and
keep.
In brief, Germany must lay her cards on the table. If she wants
peace--and certainly she needs it,--she must be willing to say what she
means by it.
2. The second condition precedent to any discussion of peace terms with
Germany has been clearly defined by President Wilson in his reply to the
note issued by His Holiness Pope Benedict.
That reply was thoroughly sympathetic and conciliatory. Among its frank
and strong paragraphs there was one which must be particularly noted:
"We cannot take the word of the present rulers of Germany as a guarantee
of anything that is to endure unless explicitly supported by such
conclusive evidence of the will and purpose of the German people
themselves as the other peoples of the world would be justified in
accepting. Without such guarantees treaties of settlement, agreements
for disarmament, covenants to set up arbitration in the place of force,
territorial adjustments, reconstitutions of small nations, if made with
the German Government, no man, no nation, could now depend on."
Understand--this is not a flat refusal to treat with the House of
Hohenzollern in any circumstances, which the more rabid and less
thoughtful newspapers of England have urged. It is merely a statement
that the rulers of Germany must have behind them a sufficient and
explicit mandate and guarantee of the people of Germany before we can
trust them.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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