It is wrong to assume that corruption is necessarily, or even mostly, monetary or pecuniary. Corruption is built on mutual expectations. The reasonable expectation of a future benefit is, in itself, a benefit. Access, influence peddling, property rights, exclusivity, licences, permits, a job, a recommendation - all constitute benefits. (e) That the service, information, or goods that are withheld are withheld because no benefit was provided or promised by the recipient. Even then, in CEE, we can distinguish between a few types of corrupt and venal behaviours in accordance with their OUTCOMES (utilities): (1) Income Supplement Corrupt actions whose sole outcome is the supplementing of the income of the provider without affecting the "real world" in any manner. Though the perception of corruption itself is a negative outcome - it is so only when corruption does not constitute an acceptable and normative part of the playing field. When corruption becomes institutionalised - it also becomes predictable and is easily and seamlessly incorporated into decision making processes of all economic players and moral agents. They develop "by- passes" and "techniques" which allow them to restore an efficient market equilibrium. In a way, all-pervasive corruption is transparent and, thus, a form of taxation. This is the most common form of corruption exercised by low and mid-ranking civil servants, party hacks and municipal politicians throughout the CEE. More than avarice, the motivating force here is sheer survival. The acts of corruption are repetitive, structured and in strict accordance with an un-written tariff and code of conduct. (2) Acceleration Fees Corrupt practices whose sole outcome is to ACCELERATE decision making, the provision of goods and services or the divulging of information. None of the outcomes or the utility functions are altered. Only the speed of the economic dynamics is altered. This kind of corruption is actually economically BENEFICIAL. It is a limited transfer of wealth (or tax) which increases efficiency. This is not to say that bureaucracies and venal officialdoms, over-regulation and intrusive political involvement in the workings of the marketplace are good (efficient) things. They are not. But if the choice is between a slow, obstructive and passive-aggressive civil service and a more forthcoming and accommodating one (the result of bribery) - the latter is preferable.