It is not necessary to consider at length the immediate causes of the war or to marshal the evidence in proof of Great Britain’s disinterested and resolute endeavor to avert the conflict. Few of the great wars of history stand the cold, unimpassioned scrutiny of later generations. We have, however, overwhelming evidence that Germany plotted and prepared for sovereignty in Europe and an unchallenged primacy among the nations. The world has been astounded by the revelation of German motives, the inflexible persistence of German policy, the extent and efficiency of German preparation. It was only by the mercy of God and the martyrdom of Belgium that France was not brought to her knees before she could organize her valiant defence or the heroic British regiments unite with the French legions to check the advance on Paris. While time lasts the betrayal of Belgium will have shameful pre-eminence in what John Morley calls “The sombre tragedy of human history.” Nor would Great Britain have escaped lasting dishonor if she had failed in fidelity to France and Belgium at any cost of life and treasure. It is not necessary to argue that the violation of Belgian neutrality alone explains the British declaration of war upon Germany. That cause was adequate, if there were no other, but there were other considerations of direct and tremendous consequence to the British Empire. VIII. Looking to the future British statesmen could not doubt that Germany, triumphant over France and Belgium, with power of dictation over Russia, with mastery of Turkey, and with Vienna in subjection to Berlin, would organize its resources and consolidate its energies for an attack upon Britain and her Dominions. Indeed all that has been disclosed shows clearly that the destruction of Great Britain and partial or complete suzerainty over the self-governing British nations was the ultimate object of German policy. With a land army unequalled in Europe the Kaiser set himself to rival the British navy and the British merchant marine. A great navy was not required to ensure the political security or protect the commerce of Germany. Only by naval power could the British Empire exist. When we think of the achievements of the Germanic alliance against a world in arms we realize what a mortal hazard the British Empire would have faced in single combat against enemies enriched by the spoils of victory over France, Russia and Belgium, and with all the smaller nations of Europe reduced to submissive neutrality. It was vital, therefore, that Britain should enter the struggle not only by virtue of honorable alliances but to guard her very existence. Moreover, if Britain had hesitated at the outset it is certain that her position would quickly have become intolerable. In a few weeks or months she would have had to send her fleet to sea and organize her manhood for defence. Delay, resulting from foolish confidence or timid counsels, would have been dangerous