I desire to emphasise one point and that is that throughout the long and bitter struggle between the Stuarts and Parliament, the Stuarts acted for the maintenance of Law and Order, and there is no doubt that both law and history were on their side. On the eve of the Civil War, the question that divided the parties was this: could the Crown, in the maintenance of Law and Order, claim the passive obedience of the subject or was there any power of resistance in the subject, though that resistance might result in disorder and in breaches of law? The adherents of the Parliament stood for power and the majesty of the people, the authority and independence of Parliament, individual liberty, the right to resist and the right to compel abdication and deposition of the Crown, in a word, they stood by them against the coercive power of the State. The adherence of the Crown stood for indefeasible rights--a right to claim passive obedience and secure non-resistance on the part of the subject through the process of Law and Order; in a word, they stood for State coercion and compulsory co-operation against individual liability. The issue was decided in favour of Parliament but as it must happen in every war of arms, the victory for individual liberty was only temporary. Though the result of Civil War was disastrous from the point of view of individual liberty, and though it required another revolution--this time, a non-violent revolution--to put individual liberty on a sure foundation "the knowledge that the subject had sat in rude judgment on their King, man to man, speeded the slow emancipation of the mind from the shackles of custom and ancient reverence." The Revolution of 1688--a bloodless revolution--secured for England that Rule of Law which is the only sure foundation for the maintenance of Law and Order. It completed the work which the Long Parliament had begun and which the execution of Charles I. had interrupted. But how was the peaceful revolution of 1688 brought about? By defiance of authority and by rigid adherence to the principle that it is the inalienable right of the subject to resist the exercise by the executive of wide, arbitrary or discretionary powers of constraint.