In the month of March an unforeseen incident arose in Korea which solved the problem of “financial and military advisers.” M. Speyer, formerly Russian Minister in Tokyo, had been transferred to Seoul, with the promise that he should succeed to the representation in Pekin. M. Speyer was a conscientious diplomatist, and when the Emperor of Korea refused to accept certain proposals made by his Russian “financial and military advisers,” he issued an ultimatum. His Majesty was allowed twenty-four hours to decide whether he had need of these advisers. M. Speyer would not have laid such a trap for himself and M. Alexieff if he had not been convinced that the Emperor would be terrified into acceptance of every demand. But His Majesty, assured of support from another quarter and aware of the dispute between Russia and Japan, showed unexpected firmness. After three days’ delay he informed M. Speyer that he had no further need of Russian advisers, and, “with many thanks for past services,” discharged them from their engagements. Here was an _impasse_ from which there was no escape without betraying the determination of the Czar not to relax his hold on Korea. In St. Petersburg it was recognised that their representative had managed the business badly and had defeated their carefully laid scheme. M. Speyer accordingly did not go to Pekin, but was sent to vegetate at Rio Janeiro. This incident removed every obstacle to agreement on the subject of Korea, and on April 25th, 1898, was signed the Nissi and Rosen Convention, which solved the problem of Russian advisers. Russia was the more ready to make this concession because nearly a month before--on March 27--a convention had been signed in Pekin, whereby China ceded to the Czar the use of Port Arthur, Talien and the adjacent country. Count Muravieff was evidently convinced that the withdrawal of the Russian advisers from Korea and the formal recognition of Japan’s interest in that country would be regarded in Tokyo as ample compensation for the occupation of Port Arthur. He boldly expressed this opinion in an interview with the Japanese Minister, who pointed out that, after all, this was a very one-sided arrangement, inasmuch as, while Japan’s preponderant interests in Korea were admitted, she was expressly forbidden by the Nissi-Rosen convention to appoint advisers to the Emperor of Korea.