The occupation of Wei-hai-wei by Great Britain followed soon afterwards. Russia clearly anticipated this move, for in April Count Muravieff caused the Japanese Government to understand that, if they desired it, China would give an assurance that, after the withdrawal of the Japanese troops, Wei-hai-wei should not be conceded to any other Power. Russia was prepared to assent to such an assurance, and was willing to use her efforts to induce the other Powers to accept that arrangement. From this act of amazing self-denial Russia was saved by the Japanese and British Governments. Japan declared that she had no wish to impose such a condition in the terms of evacuation, and Great Britain, with the connivance of the Government in Tokyo, and in despite of Russia, calmly stepped into Wei-hai-wei. These facts, which cannot be disputed, afford abundant evidence of the extreme moderation of the Japanese demands. They prove that the Japanese manifested no hostility to the Russian occupation of Port Arthur, but were prepared to make great concessions in order to secure the heritage of Korea, to which they were entitled by conquest, by “pacific penetration,” and by the necessities of geographical position. But appetite comes with eating. Having absorbed Port Arthur and begun on Manchuria, Russia saw no reason why she should not have Korea also. When her Imperial company promoters and traders crossed the Yalu, Japanese patience was exhausted. Her fleet and army had been more successful than her diplomatists, and were more ready to accept the challenge. The Anglo-Japanese alliance--the sequel to the Russian occupation of Manchuria after the Boxer trouble--ensured for her a fair fight, and Japan proceeded to demonstrate to an amazed world that the Muscovite giant, who had long overshadowed the East, has feet of clay and the hollowness of sounding brass. Chapter II JAPANESE STUDY OF THE RUSSIAN ARMY. The issues of war are not determined by numbers and bank balances. If victory depended on these factors the British Empire would never have been created. Our forefathers happily knew not the law of military science that judges the strength of an army by its size. They were conscious of another factor that cannot be expressed in figures, in differences of armament or even in the genius of commanders. This factor is the spirit of the army. Intangible as the law of gravitation, it cannot be stated in terms of any known value, yet it gives momentum to the mass, and without it discipline is but blind obedience, and courage the mere absence of fear. The duty of military science should be to determine this factor not less than to ascertain the numerical strength and armament of an enemy.