Mindful of this duty the Japanese studied the character of the Russian soldier and found him lacking in qualities that make an army invincible. The best testimony I can offer on this subject is a confidential paper written by General Fujii, Chief of the Staff of General Kuroki’s Army and Commandant of the Staff College. It is a concise and modest document, yet it contains psychological truths of greater value than columns of facts and figures. It is clear from this official survey that the Japanese did not accept the European estimate of the fighting capacity of their enemy. A military _attaché_ who was in a large measure responsible for British official opinion of the Russian army exclaimed after the battle of Liao-yang: “My reputation is gone! For years I have been urging that Russian troops are invincible and here am I running away with them every day!” The Staff in Tokyo were under no delusion. After careful study and observation they discovered the weak places in the Muscovite armour and were never for a moment doubtful of the issue. They knew the capacity of the Russian officer, his want of initiative, his proneness to jealousy and divided counsel, his readiness to put personal interest and comfort before every other consideration. Among the multitude of things left behind by the Russians in their retreat from Liao-yang not the least interesting and valuable were the general orders issued from day to day by their Commander-in-Chief. They disclose the gravest defects in the discipline of the army, and more especially of the Cossacks. It appears from them that the Colonel of one Cossack regiment was removed from his command for deserting a post of great importance at the mere rumour of the approach of the enemy and without writing to inform the force to his immediate front--a defection that endangered the whole movement. Two Colonels of the 23rd East Siberian Regiment were cashiered for reasons not stated, and the Commanding Officer of the 3rd Ural Cossacks was dismissed the service for conduct unworthy of an officer and for habitual drunkenness. These are only a few examples of the looseness of discipline in the higher commissioned ranks. Numbers of Russian officers, according to the testimony of British and French Missionaries in Liao-yang, were drinking with courtesans while their regiments were fighting at the front. Many also were censured by General Kuropatkin for discussing in public the conduct of the war and the character of their seniors in rank. The state of affairs disclosed in these documents confirmed the Japanese in their opinion that the Russians were inferior to themselves in discipline and training, and will strengthen the conviction of all who have mingled with Russian military and naval officers that the army officer is often a person of inferior character and social position. So marked, indeed, is the distinction, that Russian naval officers rarely accept on a footing of social equality their comrades in the army.