The Russians had plenty of time to make their dispositions. For several weeks they had held the north bank of the Ai-ho with twenty thousand infantry and Cossacks and forty-eight guns. In contesting the passage of a river it is obviously necessary to keep a large reserve with which to strike the enemy when he attempts to cross. But in a country devoid of lateral communications--like that occupied by the Russians--this precaution could be adopted only on one condition: that the point of attack was known. To concentrate at Antung, if the Japanese crossed at Suikochin or at Fushan, would be fatal. The plan of defence must be well conceived from the beginning or it was destined to fail. Now the Russian General could not learn the direction of the attack. The movements of the Japanese puzzled him, as it was intended that they should. Some of the younger officers believed that the crossing would be effected on the upper reaches of the Yalu near Suikochin, and urged that the left flank should be strengthened. This theory met with no support among the senior officers, who thought that no serious movement could be made in such difficult country. Others maintained that the Japanese would bridge the river between Wiju and Chiu-lien-cheng, and would follow the Imperial Pekin road. But the weight of authority was in favour of Antung, where it was comparatively easy to bridge the Yalu. In that belief General Zasselitch was confirmed by the naval demonstrations that took place in front of Antung, and he accordingly posted his reserves near that place. On the last day of April the Russian front extended along the North bank of the river Ai for a distance of nearly eighteen miles. Their right flank was at Antung, their centre at Chiu-lien-cheng, and their left wing rested on the mountains near Wezukau. One regiment was stationed at Antung, on the hill to the North of which was a battery of eight guns; a regiment and a half, with two field batteries, held Chiu-lien-cheng; at Yushukau was another regiment with one battery; to the North of Wezukau were two companies of infantry and one field battery, and in the heights about Hamatan, to the West of Chiu-lien-cheng, where the road from Antung branches West to Feng-hoang-cheng, were posted two regiments in reserve, with one battery. Both flanks were protected by cavalry, General Mistchenko being at Tajushan, some miles to the West of Antung, where it was anticipated that the Japanese would attempt to land a small force. The hills were entrenched at several points; trenches commanded the river bank; upon summit and ridge were gun emplacements and sungars. These works were constructed by the infantry, aided by Chinese, the engineers being occupied with the roads and bridges on the line of communication which passed through Feng-hoang-cheng to Liao-yang. No attempt had been made to mask the trenches, which were of the most primitive design, and gave neither head cover nor protection against shell fire.