The fight on the Yalu has been described as a frontal attack with all its defects. This description appears to me inaccurate. It is true that the left front was the first to get into close touch with the enemy on the 1st of May, and that in crossing the Ai-ho it suffered heavier losses than any other part of the line. But at least twelve hours before this the flanking movement on the extreme right had began to develope, and had shaken the confidence of the Russians to such a degree that they were falling back and had already withdrawn their guns. The Japanese claim that the trenches on the spur East of Chiu-lien-cheng were taken by direct assault. From that opinion I take the liberty to dissent. I was right in front of the position and could see clearly every movement of the attacking force. It is detracting nothing from the gallantry of the soldiers who fought so stubbornly with their backs to the river to say that the position was really taken in reverse by the left centre. Then only was the attack from the front pushed home to the point so stoutly defended by the enemy. No praise can be too great for the Japanese soldiers. On the eve of the battle they had not slept; they had to march across a great sandy plain and to ford a river before they could engage the enemy. The victory however was complete, and was gained at a sacrifice that must be accounted very small. [Illustration: A Gun Team in the Water.] The question naturally arises: Why did not the Russians attempt a counter attack as soon as the Twelfth Division crossed the river and was divided from the rest of the army. The Japanese reserves were at Kurito and the mountainous nature of the country did not favour rapid concentration toward the East, while the guns could not cover the extreme right. In 1894 the Chinese descended in great force from these mountains on the East and inflicted serious loss on the Japanese. Moreover, there was this in favour of a counter attack--that the Japanese having crossed the river were compelled to move through difficult country along a flank at right angles to their original line of advance. They would consequently have been under very serious disabilities had they been forced to retire. The Japanese certainly feared such a counter attack, and made preparations to restore the balance by holding the Second Division and the reserves in readiness to drive a wedge into the Russian centre. They had, however, every confidence in the capacity of the Twelfth Division to hold their own in the mountains, and that confidence was strengthened by manifest want of enterprise on the part of the enemy. But the greatest error of all was the tenacity with which the Russian commander clung to the belief that the crossing would be attempted in front of Antung. As a consequence of this conviction the reserves were posted on the right wing at the back of Antung where they were useless in emergency and it was in