The terrible effect of the Japanese fire, both direct and indirect, may have aided the Russian General to arrive at the determination to retire his field guns and machine guns, but if that was the reason, why were they not moved earlier and to a safe distance? Only once in the action on May 1st was the Russian artillery used, and not more than half-a-dozen shots were fired before it was silenced. Seeing that the guns never came into action after the bombardment of the 30th, why were they not retired into the mountains beyond the possible reach of the enemy? It is not easy to explain this lack of ordinary precaution on any other ground than overweening confidence or hopeless confusion and disorder. Russian prisoners admitted that six thousand men were defending the Yalu, and this estimate probably took no account of the three thousand at Antung and the force on the left of the line. I cannot help thinking that in the hands of half as many Boers such a position might have been defended for several days even against so determined and gallant an enemy as the Japanese. But the Russians displayed little skill in selecting points of defence, or in constructing earthworks. Their gun positions were exposed. The Japanese spoke of the trenches as exceedingly strong. I can only describe them as primitive and ineffective. The enemy’s weakness in this respect accounts for the comparatively heavy casualties. A great proportion of the losses were due to shell fire, against which the trenches and sungars gave no protection. From the appearance of many of the slain it was clear that the explosive used in the Japanese common shell has terrific power. The shells split up into a thousand fragments, with sharp edges that must have been so many swords hurled in every direction. In no other shells have I seen so many sharp pieces: it looked as if the shells not merely broke but laminated. One conclusion may fairly be drawn from the use that the Japanese made of common shell--that it is more effective than shrapnel even against exposed masses of men and guns. The Japanese have learnt this lesson very thoroughly and make but sparing use of shrapnel, and then only to supplement the effect of common shell. They have also confirmed our experience in South Africa that the howitzer is a valuable auxiliary in the field, and has sufficient mobility so that it need not be tied to any fixed position.