As to the differences between the two wars, it may be said that-- 1. In the Thirty Years' War both belligerents finally proved to be nearly equal in strength. In the European war one of the belligerents, though at first meeting with reverses, in the end completely overcame the other. 2. The Thirty Years' War ended in the exhaustion of both belligerents; the European war closed with the exhaustion of only one belligerent. 3. The Thirty Years' War was waged for religious convictions rather than for gain; the European war was not so ideal in its purposes. Taking a general view of the similarities and differences between the two wars, the one great question arises: Is the experience of the present European war strong enough for victors and vanquished alike to be willing to yield sufficient of their natural rights and sovereignty to submit all questions of war to some superior international court from which there is no appeal? In the Thirty Years' War nothing further was necessary; the exhaustion of both belligerents was sufficient to end religious wars. As the victorious party in war is much less inclined (if inclined at all) than the conquered foe to yield anything, will the Allies, without the experience of defeat and exhaustion, be willing to yield enough of their sovereignty to make the future peace of the world permanent? Will they be magnanimous and give up some national advantages of the present for future international benefits to all mankind? In short, are they unselfish enough to so temper their justice with mercy as to establish a world peace, the greatest boon to humanity ever known? Here is a supreme opportunity. Will the victorious Allies arise to the occasion and make future wars improbable, if not impossible? We say "impossible," because if a nation is recalcitrant it can be punished by a general boycott, leading toward its economic ruin. As the instinct of self-preservation is the most powerful influence in nations as well as in individuals, it is a moral certainty that no nation could or would submit very long to such punishment. Just after a war is ended, when the belligerents feel more keenly its effect than later on, they are much more disposed to make mutual concessions. Will the victors of the European War strike at once while the iron is hot, and insist on the one paramount issue, the absolute prohibition of all wars? Such a decision would radiate through all further proceedings of the League of Nations and greatly facilitate its work. By thus making a certainty of the most important question of all history, no matter how difficult and delicate matters of greater or less importance may be, the League of Nations will have assured its success in advance as the greatest and most beneficent influence that the world has ever experienced, just as the peace of Westphalia was in its generation.