blood of France, with other eminent personages, and many of the Spanish grandees. No such naval and military combination had been attempted in Europe since the days of the Armada; and it was not unnatural that the Spaniards should anticipate from it a decisive triumph. They seem, however, to have put their faith more particularly in the battering-ships; and so great an enthusiasm was excited, that to hint at their possible failure was considered a mark of treason. General Elliot was in nowise shaken from his usual calmness by this tremendous display of force. His garrison at this time (September 1782) numbered about 7500 men, of whom 400 were in hospital. These he distributed so as to guard most efficiently the points at which the enemy’s attack would probably be delivered. The fortifications were carefully examined, and additional works erected wherever they could be of service. Though the Spaniards poured on the garrison an incessant storm of shot and shell, the governor, in order to husband his resources, permitted but little firing in return, except when it was necessary to silence or destroy some particular battery. The troops under his command were few in number, it is true, but they were veterans, inured to war, who had been long accustomed to the effects of artillery, and gradually prepared to meet the supreme ordeal that now awaited them. His subordinates were officers of approved courage, intelligence, and discretion; eminent “for all the accomplishments of their profession,” and enjoying the entire confidence of the men under their orders. And the spirits of all were animated by the ease with which former attacks had been defeated, as well as by the success attending some recent experiments of firing red-hot shot, which, on this occasion, would enable them, they hoped, “to bring their labours to a period, and relieve them from the tedious cruelty of another vexatious blockade.”