765 Cfr. his treatise _De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio_, I, 12 (ed. Fèvre, tom. V, p. 527, Paris 1873): “_Prima opinio eorum est, qui gratiam efficacem constituunt in assensu et cooperatione humana, ita ut ab eventu dicatur gratia efficax, quia videlicet sortitur effectum et ideo sortitur effectum, quia voluntas humana cooperatur. Itaque existimant hi autores, in potestate hominis esse ut gratiam faciat esse efficacem, quae alioquin ex se non esset nisi sufficiens._” Bellarmine treats this opinion as the extreme counterpart of Thomism (which he also combats) and disposes of it thus: “_Haec opinio aliena est omnino a sententia b. Augustini et, quantum ego existimo, a sententia etiam Scripturarum divinarum._” (_l.c._) Among the Scriptural texts which he quotes in support of this view are John VI, 45, 1 Cor. IV, 7, Rom. IX, 11. 766 The learned Cardinal describes the difference between Congruism and extreme Molinism (which latter, it may be remarked, was not defended by Molina himself) as follows: “_Neque enim intelligi potest, quo pacto gratia efficax consistat in illa interna suasione, quae per liberum arbitrium respui potest, et tamen infallibilem effectum habeat, nisi addamus, Deum iis quos efficaciter et infallibiliter trahere decrevit, eam suasionem adhibere quam videt congruere ingenio eorum et quam certo novit ab eis non contemnendam._” (_Op. cit._, p. 531.) The objection that this explanation eventually resolves itself into the Molinistic theory which he had censured, Bellarmine meets as follows: “_Respondeo sententiam nostram, quam S. Augustini esse demonstravimus, aliqua in re cum prima illa opinione convenire, sed in multis ab illa discrepare. Convenit enim in eo quod utraque sententia gratiam sufficentem et efficacem ponit in auxilio excitante potissimum, non in adiuvante. Sed discrepant inter se, quod prima opinio vult efficaciam gratiae pendere a voluntate humana, nostra vero pendere vult a voluntate Dei._” (_l.c._, cap. 13.) 767 Further details in Schneemann, _Hist. Controv._, pp. 302 sqq.