In B.C. 216, Æmilius Paulus and Varro were consuls. The former was a man of high character and attainments; Varro came of plebeian stock, was overbearing and self-sufficient. The Roman and Carthaginian armies lay facing each other near the Aufidus, Hannibal backing on Cannæ. His position here had been the result of an admirable manœuvre. The consuls commanded on alternate days. There had been a serious combat on the last day of Varro’s command, in which the Carthaginians had been outnumbered two to one, and been defeated. This had greatly elated Varro, and whetted his appetite for battle. He left the troops at evening in such a manner that next day his associate was badly placed. Æmilius scarcely wished to withdraw, lest his men should be disheartened; he could not remain where he was, as he was exposed to Hannibal’s better cavalry. He took a middle course, on the whole unwise. He sent a third of his force to the north of the Aufidus, a trifle up-stream, to sustain some foragers he had there, and make a secondary camp, from which to annoy Hannibal’s parties in search of corn. This division of forces was very risky. Hannibal had long been trying to bring the consuls to battle, and now saw that the moment had come, for Varro was precipitate, and would probably draw Æmilius into active measures. [Illustration: BATTLE OF CANNÆ B.C. 216, I] Each general made a stirring address to his army. Polybius gives both. Hannibal’s has the true ring of the great captain. “Let us hasten into action. I promise you victory, and, the gods willing, I will make my promise good.” Two days later Hannibal offered Æmilius battle. But Æmilius declined it, and Hannibal sent his Numidians to the other side to annoy the Roman foragers. The succeeding day, knowing Varro to be in command, Hannibal again offered battle, aware that the hot-tempered Roman would be burning to avenge the yesterday’s taunt. He left eight thousand men to guard his camp. There has been much discussion as to which bank of the Aufidus was the scene of the battle. It seems to me that the plan in the diagram comes nearest to fitting all the statements, however conflicting, of the several authorities. Near Hannibal’s camp the Aufidus makes a bold, southerly sweep. Here Hannibal forded the stream in two columns, drew up his army, and leaned his flanks on the river-banks so as to prevent the Romans, with their numerical superiority, from overlapping them. His front he covered with archers and slingers, so as to hide his formation from the Roman generals. Varro, as Hannibal anticipated, thought the Carthaginians were crossing to attack the lesser camp, and leaving eleven thousand men to guard the larger one, with orders to attack Hannibal’s camp during the battle, he also crossed and drew up in the plain opposite the Carthaginians, he and every Roman in the ranks craving to come to blows with the hated invaders.