Grounds of Natural Philosophy: Divided into Thirteen Parts: The Second Edition, much altered from the First, which went under the Name of Philosophical and Physical Opinions — John Shaqi
Grounds of Natural Philosophy: Divided into Thirteen Parts: The Second Edition, much altered from the First, which went under the Name of Philosophical and Physical OpinionsNewcastle, Margaret Cavendish, Duchess of
Philosophy
Grounds of Natural Philosophy: Divided into Thirteen Parts: The Second Edition, much altered from the First, which went under the Name of Philosophical and Physical Opinions
Newcastle, Margaret Cavendish, Duchess of
Physics -- Early works to 1800
Some may make this Question,_ Whether the Three sorts of Parts, the
Rational, Sensitive, and Inanimate, may be singly perceived?_ I answer,
Not unless there were single Parts in Nature; but, though they cannot
be singly perceived, yet they singly perceive; because, every Part hath
its own motion, and so its own perception. And though those Parts, that
have not self-motion, have not perception; yet, being joined, as one
Body, to the Sensitive, they may by the Sensitive Motion, have some
different sorts of Self-knowledg, caused by the different actions of
the Sensitive parts; but that is not _Perception_. But, as I said, the
_Triumphant Parts_ cannot be perceived distinctly asunder, though their
Actions may be different: for, the joining, or intermixing of Parts,
hinders not the several Actions; as for example, A Man is composed of
several Parts, or, (as the Learned term them) _Corporeal Motions_; yet,
not any of those different Parts, or Corporeal Motions, are a hindrance
to each other: The same between the _Sensitive_ and _Rational Parts_.
CHAP. XII. Whether Nature can know her self, or have an Absolute Power
of her self, or have an exact Figure.
I was of an opinion, That Nature, because Infinite, could not know
her Self; because Infinite hath no limit. Also, That Nature could not
have an Absolute Power over her own Parts, because she had Infinite
Parts; and, that the Infiniteness did hinder the Absoluteness: But
since I have consider'd, That the Infinite Parts must of necessity be
Self-knowing; and that those Infinite Self-knowing Parts are united in
one Infinite Body, by which Nature must have both an United Knowledg,
and an United Power. Also, I questioned, Whether Nature could have an
Exact Figure, (but, mistake me not; for I do not mean the Figure of
Matter, but a composed Figure of Parts) because Nature was composed
of Infinite Variety of Figurative Parts: But considering, that those
Infinite Varieties of Infinite Figurative Parts, were united into one
Body; I did conclude, That she must needs have an Exact Figure, though
she be Infinite: As for example, This World is composed of numerous
and several Figurative parts, and yet the World hath an exact Form and
Frame, the same which it would have if it were Infinite. But, as for
Self-knowledg, and Power, certainly God hath given them to Nature,
though her Power be limited: for, she cannot move beyond her Nature;
nor hath she power to make her self any otherwise than what she is,
since she cannot create, or annihilate any part, or particle: nor can
she make any of her Parts, Immaterial; or any Immaterial, Corporeal:
Nor can she give to one part, the Nature (_viz_. the Knowledg, Life,
Motion, or Perception) of another part; which is the reason one
Creature cannot have the properties, or faculties of another; they may
have the like, but not the same.
CHAP. XIII. Nature cannot judg her self.
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